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INTRODUCTION

T

he Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 19761 (the Act or the

FSIA) extends immunity from legal action to foreign states and

their agencies and instrumentalities, subject to various exceptions and
qualifications. In addition, the Act establishes a comprehensive juris2
dictional scheme for actions involving foreign states.
These provisions effect substantial changes from prior law, which
was outdated, uncertain and heavily influenced by foreign policy

considerations of the executive branch of government. 3 Legislators
1. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891

(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1604-1607 (1976). For a brief analysis of the Act's
operation as a long-arm statute, see East Europe Domestic Int'l Sales Corp. v. Terra,
467 F. Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 610 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1979); see H.R. Rep. No.
1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-14, 16-22, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 6604, 6611-13, 6614-21 [hereinafter cited as House Report]. Great Britain
enacted a very similar law in 1978. The State Immunity Act, 1978, ch.33.
3. See T. Giuttari, The American Law of Sovereign Immunity (1970); S. Sucharitkul, State Immunities and Trading Activities in International Law (1959);
Garcia-Mora, The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity of Foreign States and Its Recent
Modifications, 42 Va. L. Rev. 335 (1956); Goodman, Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns: A Political or Legal Question-Victory Transport Revisited, 38 Brooklyn L,
Rev. 885 (1972); Lauterpacht, The Problem of JurisdictionalImmunities of Foreign
States, 28 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 220 (1951); Lowenfeld, Litigatinga Sovereign Immunity
Claim-The Haiti Case, 49 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 377 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Lowenfeld I]; Lowenfeld, ClaimsAgainst Foreign States-A ProposalFor Reform of United
States Law, 44 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 901 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Lowenfeld II]; Pugh
& McLaughlin, JurisdictionalImmunities of Foreign States, 41 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 25
(1966); Timberg, Sovereign Immunity, State Trading, Soialism and Sell-Deception,
56 Nw. U. L. Rev. 109 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Timberg I]; Note, The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Giving the Plaintiff His Day in Court, 46
Fordham L. Rev. 543 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Day in Court]; Note, The Jurisdc-
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and jurists have high hopes that the FSIA will be successful in curing
the many problems that previously attended litigation against foreign

states in United States courts. 4 A substantial number of cases have
now been decided under the Act, and the time has come to undertake
an initial assessment of its success in addressing the problems that
existed in the prior law of sovereign immunity.

This Article focuses on the policies underlying various aspects of the
law of sovereign immunity and explores its conceptual structure. Part

I briefly explains the roots of sovereign immunity and traces its evolution to the present day. This will provide a mode of analysis for the
modem law of sovereign immunity.
Part II describes and analyzes the most troubling problems that
existed in the rules of immunity in 1976, when the FSIA was enacted.
Part III evaluates the Act's proffered solutions to the problems described in Part II. The evaluation discusses whether those problems
have been solved by the statute and suggests tentative remedies in
those areas where difficulties remain.

tional Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns, 63 Yale L.J. 1148 (1954) [hereinafter cited as
JurisdictionalImmunity]; J. Sweeney, The International Law of Sovereign Immunity (October 1963) (Policy Research Study, Bureau of Intelligence & Research, U.S.
Dep't of State); see also Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States §§ 65-72 (1965).
4. See Atkeson, Perkins & Wyatt, H.R. 11315-The Revised State-Justice Bill
on Foreign Sovereign Immunity: Time for Action, 70 Am. J. Int'l L. 298 (1976);
Carl, Suing Foreign Governments in American Courts: The United States Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act in Practice, 33 Sw. L.J. 1009 (1979); Delaume, Public
Debt and Sovereign Immunity: The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 71
Am. J. Int'l L. 399 (1977); Kahale & Vega, Immunity and Jurisdiction: Toward a
Uniform Body of Law in Actions Against Foreign States, 18 Colum. J. Transnat'l L.
211 (1979); Sklaver, Sovereign Immunity in the United States: An Analysis of S. 566,
8 Int'l Law. 408 (1974); von Mehren, The ForeignSovereign ImmunitiesAct of 1976,
17 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 33 (1978); Weber, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976: Its Origin, Meaning and Effect, 3 Yale St. World Pub. Ord. 1 (1976); Note,
Sovereign Immunity-Limits of Judicial Control-The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891, 18 Harv. Int'l L.J. 429 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Sovereign Immunity]; Note, Sovereign Immunity-Proposed
Statutory Elimination of State Department Role-Attachment, Service of Process
and Execution-Senate Bill 566, 93d Congress, 1st Session (1973), 15 Harv. Int'l L.J.
157 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Statutory Elimination]; Note, The Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns in U.S. Courts-ProposedLegislation, 6 N.Y.U. J. Int'l
L. & Pol. 473 (1973); Note, ProposedDraft Legislationon the Sovereign Immunity of
Foreign Governments: An Attempt to Revest the Courts with a JudicialFunction, 69
Nw. U. L. Rev. 302 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Draft Legislation]; Note,
The Problem of Execution Uniformity Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976 and FederalRule of Civil Procedure69, 12 Val. L. Rev. 569 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Problem of Execution Uniformity]; Note, The Statutory Proposal to
Regulate the JurisdictionalImmunities of Foreign States, 6 Vand. J. Transnat'l L.
549 (1973); 4 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 146 (1977).
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THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

The concept of sovereign immunity embodies the principle that the
government of a nation, state, or political subdivision thereof may not
be subjected to process in a court of law without its consent.5 No
person may compel an immune sovereign to litigate claims against it,
irrespective of the legitimacy of those claims or the wrongfulness of
the governmental conduct giving rise to the claims. This general
principle, however, is subject to numerous exceptions and qualifications.
The law of sovereign immunity draws a fundamental distinction
between the domestic sovereign and foreign states." The privilege of
immunity extends to both, but its underlying rationale differs depending upon which kind of sovereign is involved. Consequently, rules of
foreign state immunity have developed independently of those regulating immunity in the municipal context.
A. The Roots of Sovereign Immunity.
1. Sovereign Immunity in Municipal Law

Sovereign immunity in domestic law shields the United States gov-

ernment 7 from lawsuits by private citizens without its consent. 8 Such

5. The general principle was first formulated in Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812). Accord Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304
U.S. 126, 134 (1938); United States v. Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520, 524 (1875).
6. In United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 209 (1882), Justice Miller noted that
sovereign immunity of foreign states is based on different considerations from those
giving rise to immunity of the domestic government. See National City Bank v.
Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 358-59 (1955); Guaranty Trust Co. v. United
States, 304 U.S. 126, 132-36 (1938); Ulen & Co. v. Bank Cospodarstwa Krajowego
(National Economic Bank), 261 A.D. 1, 4-5, 24 N.Y.S.2d 201, 204 (1940).
7. State governments generally also enjoy immunity from suit in their own
courts. See Railroad Co. v. Tennessee, 101 U.S. 337 (1879); Beers v. Arkansas, 61
U.S. (20 How.) 527 (1857); Kramer, The Governmental Tort Immunity Doctrine in
the United States 1790-1955, 1966 U. Ill. L.F. 795; Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort
Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U. Ill. L.F. 919. A more complicated issue is
whether state governments may be sued in federal court. See Engdahl, Immunity
and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1, 7-12
(1972). For a case discussing the immunity of one state in the courts of another, see
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979). See generally Martiniak, Hall v. Nevada: State
Court Jurisdiction Over Sister States v. American State Sovereign Immunity, 63
Calif. L. Rev. 1144 (1975).
8. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139-40 (1950); United States v.
Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941); Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort
(pt. 7), 28 Colum. L. Rev. 577 (1928) [hereinafter cited as Borchard I]; Borchard,
Governmental Responsibility in Tort (pts. 4-6), 36 Yale L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926-27)
[hereinafter cited as Borchard II]; Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, (pts
1-3), 34 Yale L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924) [hereinafter cited its Borchard III]; Jaffe, Suits
Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 209 (1963);

19811

FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

consent has been given statutorily for many types of actions, but its
existence does not detract from the validity of the basic principle of
immunity.9
This principle is rooted in the twelfth century English feudal system, in which each petty lord held his own court to settle the disputes
of his vassals.' 0 Because the lord controlled the court, as a matter of
practical necessity it was powerless to coerce him. The petty lord,
however, was vassal of the king or a higher lord and was subject to
suit in the latters' courts. Only the king, who stood at the apex of the
feudal pyramid, was completely immune from suit, for no court
existed higher than his own."
This system of sovereign immunity was based on the impracticability of coercing a lord or the king in their own courts, rather than on
any abstract notion that the king could do no wrong.' 2 Indeed,
because the feudal system admitted the possibility that the king could
do wrong, the "petition of right" developed to hold him accountable. 3 This petition, dating from the thirteenth century, was distinguished from the "petition of grace" and could not rightfully be
denied by the king.' 4 Thus, it represented a mechanism to circumvent the sovereign's personal right of immunity from suit.
In the sixteenth century the conceptual view of the sovereign
changed, and immunity from suit became premised on the idea that
the sovereign could do no wrong. Thomas Hobbes and, to a lesser
extent, Jean Bodin established the proposition that the king was above
the law in the sense that he was the law-giver appointed by God.
Thus, the king could not be subjected to the indignity of suit by his
subjects.' 5 This fundamental shift in the perception of the king,
giving him the spiritually sovereign role that had previously been
reserved to the church, corresponded to secular developments. The
Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 Harv. L.
Rev. 1 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Jaffe I].
9. See, e.g., Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 26-33 (1953); Larson v.
Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 687-97 (1949); White v.
Administrator of Gen. Servs. Admin., 343 F.2d 444, 447 (9th Cir. 1965). Federal
consents to suit include the Tucker Act of 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); the Suits in Admiralty Act of 1920, ch. 95, 41 Stat.
525 (codified in scattered sections of 46 U.S.C.); and the Federal Tort Claims Act of
1946, ch. 753, tit. IV, 60 Stat. 842 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
10. See Engdahl, supra note 7, at 2-5; Jaffe I, supra note 8, at 1-19.
11. Engdahl, supra note 7, at 3 n.6 (citing 1 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, History of
English Law 518 (2d ed 1959)); see Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 414-15 (1979).
12. Engdahl, supra note 7, at 3 n.7; Jaffe I, supra note 8, at 3-4.
13. Engdahl, supra note 7, at 3; Holdsworth, The History of Remedies Against
the Crown, 38 L.Q. Rev. 141, 149 (1922).
14. Engdahl, supra note 7, at 3; Holdsworth, supra note 13, at 148-50.
15. See Borchard II, supra note 8, at 785. The seminal works on sovereignty are
J. Bodin, Six Livres de la R1publique (4th ed. 1579) (1st ed. 1576) and T. Hobbes,
Leviathan (1651).
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centralization of political functions and the concentration of military
and economic power in the king's hands contributed to the rise of the
nation-state in the form of a monarchy. These parallel spiritual and
political developments transformed the personal immunity of the king
as an individual into an institutional immunity of crown and state.'6
That transformation marks the birth of the modern concept of sovereign immunity.
Writing approximately a century after Hobbes, Blackstone stated
that the king "is not only incapable of doing wrong, but even of
thinking wrong."1 7 Blackstone, however, was sufficiently a realist to
disbelieve in the factual impossibility of an injustice done by the king.
Instead, he relied on the legal fiction that any wrong done in the
king's name was, in the eyes of the law, not done by the king at all.' 8
Blackstone thus justified the continuation of the practice of vesting
immunity in the crown, but noted that the petition of right and the
possibility of maintaining actions against government officers personally were the means of redress for wrongs committed in the name of
the crown. 19
Through Blackstone, the monarchistic doctrine of sovereign immunity was introduced to the American colonies. Although it had limited
application to the early American confederation, a number of factors
combined to cause the retention of sovereign immunity in the United
States. An important practical reason for maintaining the doctrine
was the difficult financial position of the states, which sought to
insulate themselves from crippling private claims. 20 Of course, the
nature of a confederacy required an exception to a state's immunity
when disputes arose between two states. Such disputes were best
settled in a superior federal tribunal. Thus, the states initially agreed
to be subject to suit only by each other in a federal tribunal.21 Later,
the Constitution further abrogated states' immunity from suit in federal court by providing for suits between states and citizens of another
state.22 The eleventh amendment subsequently restored states' immunity in certain limited circumstances. 23
16. Laski, The Responsibility of the State in England, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 447,
447-53 (1919); Pugh, HistoricalApproach to the Doctrineof Sovereign Immunity, 13
La. L. Rev. 476, 478-79 (1953).
17. 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on The Laws of England *246 (emphasis
omitted).
18. See id. at *238-39.
19. See Engdahl, supra note 7, at 4-5.
20. Id. at 6.
21. Id.
22. U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1. The Constitution provides that the judicial
power shall extend "to Controversies between two or more States; between a State
and Citizens of another State; ... and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." Id. The Supreme Court affirmed a state's lack of
immunity from suit by a private citizen from another state in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). See generally Engdahl, supra note 7, at 6-7.
23. U.S. Coast. amend. XI; see Engdahl, supra note 7, at 8-11.
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Initially, the more important issue was the amenability to suit of a
state or the federal government in its own courts. A number of arguments were made early on for the inapplicability of the monarchistic
concept of immunity to a republican system.2 4 Nevertheless, Americans adopted the doctrine of sovereign immunity, partly for the practical reason noted above, partly by default. Administratively, it was
considered too difficult to oblige the federal executive to enforce
federal court orders issued to the federal government.2
Notwithstanding the acceptance of the sovereign immunitN doctrine in United States law, a strong distaste for governmental immunity remained from the political climate preceding the revolution.2
Accordingly, redress for governmental wrongs was provided in the
form of personal official liability. Government officers were held
personally liable for official acts that the courts found unsupported by
law.2 7 This harsh rule resulted in the considerable erosion of immunity in the United States.
After the Civil War, sovereign immunity re-emerged as a strong
doctrine in United States law. As the responsibilities of government
became more complex, the need for immunity became more acute.
The Supreme Court acknowledged this need, recognizing an inherent
right on the part of governments to protect themselves against suit.2
In an 1868 case involving a government owned vessel, the Court
stated that
[t]he doctrine rests upon reasons of public policy.... It is obvious
that the public service would be hindered, and the public safety
endangered, if the supreme authority could be subjected to suit at
the instance of every citizen, and consequently controlled in the use
and disposition of the means required for the proper administration
of the government.2 9
The historical development of sovereign immunity reveals a significant pattern. The doctrine originated for practical reasons inherent in
the English feudal system. Subsequently, monarchist political theory
turned immunity into an absolute concept. Imported into the United

24. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 450-53, 466-69, 469-79 (1793)
(separate opinions of Iredell, J., Cushing, J., Jay, C.J.): Engdahl, supra note 7, at 7
n.26.
25. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 477-78 (1793) (Jay, C.J.);
Engdahl, supra note 7, at 11-12.
26. See J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1675
(4th ed. Boston 1873) (1st ed. Boston 1833); Engdahl, supra note 7, at 13.
27. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882); Osborn v. United States Bank, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 737 (1824); Fowler v. Lindsay, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 411 (1799): Engdahl,
supra note 7, at 14-21.
28. Nichols v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 122, 126 (186S).
29. The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 154 (1868).
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States because of historical circumstance, that concept was disfavored
and gradually eroded. 30 It revived in modern times, however, for
vastly different policy reasons concerned with
the unhampered func3
tioning of a complex modern government. '
This pattern is significant in that it attests to the doctrine's durability and flexibility. Even though it has been justified, at various times,
by very different rationales and has been operative in vastly different
political systems, it has remained intact for eight centuries. Notwithstanding the changes in underlying policies, the doctrine has retained
its original conceptual components of (i) sovereign governmental
power, (ii) immunity vested in that power, and (iii) consent voluntarily grantable by that power. As will be seen, that pattern bears a
resemblance to the development of sovereign immunity in the international context.
2. Sovereign Immunity in International Law
The classic formulation of sovereign immunity in the international
legal system was advanced by Chief Justice Marshall in The Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon.32 In that case, the Chief Justice stated:
One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another; and
being bound by obligations of the highest character not to degrade
the dignity of his nation, by placing himself or its sovereign rights
within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to enter a
foreign territory only under an express license, or in the confidence
that the immunities belonging to his independent sovereign station,
though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication, and
will be extended to him.
This perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns,
and this common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse,
and an interchange of good offices with each other, have given rise
to a class of cases in which every sovereign is understood to waive
the exercise of a part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which has been stated to be the attribute of every nation. 33
Although this case was decided in 1812, it has retained remarkable
vitality and is frequently cited today.3 4 Both American and foreign
30. The historical English basis of sovereign immunity was completely rejected in
Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341, 343 (1879). See Pugh, supra note 16, at 480.
31. For a brief analysis of some of the modern rationales underlying sovereign
immunity in tort law, see Comment, An Analysis of the Theories Advanced for the
Continuation of Municipal Tort Immunity, 2 Cum.-Sam. L. Rev. 437 (1971). See
generally Symposium, Sovereign Immunity and Public, Responsibility, 1966 U. Ill.
L.F. 793.
32. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
33. Id. at 136.
34. E.g., Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 416 (1979); First Nat'l City Bank v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 762 (1972); National City Bank v. Republic
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courts have relied on Chief Justice Marshall's opinion to such an
extent that The Schooner Exchange can be characterized as the seminal case for the modern development of sovereign immunity in the
international context.
In The Schooner Exchange, United States plaintiffs sought to attach
a French military vessel that was alleged to have been seized wrongfully by the French government. The latter defended by interposing a
claim of sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court accepted that defense, holding that the vessel could not be seized and that the French
government could not be compelled to litigate its ownership, because
sovereign immunity
shielded it from legal process in courts of the
35
United States.
Chief Justice Marshall derived the principle of immunity of foreign
governments from the independence and sovereignty of every nation. 36 He began with the fundamental axiom of modern political
theory that each nation enjoys complete and absolute sovereignty
within the boundaries of its territory. Consequently, when another
nation enters upon that territory in any capacity, it is subject to the
laws and judicial power of the host state, unless the latter agrees not to
exercise its absolute territorial power. Marshall found that in practice
all nations had consented to a relaxation of their complete territorial
jurisdiction in cases involving foreign states. Such consent, which
could be express or implied, had through common usage come to be
expected by every state when entering a foreign territory.
Marshall gave several reasons why nations had generally consented
to waive their territorial power. First, all nations are considered to
possess equal rights and equal independence in the world community.
If one nation purports to judge the actions of another, the principles of
equality and independence suffer. One nation cannot adjudicate the
rights of another without thereby implying coercion and superiority.
In order to avoid any inference of dependence and inequality,
nations
37
mutually agree upon the principle of sovereign immunity.
Another reason for extending sovereign immunity to foreign states is
a desire not to affront the latters' dignity and honor. Justice Marshall
viewed the potentially humiliating subjection to legal process as incompatible with formal and orderly conduct of diplomacy and foreign relations. Consuls and ambassadors are considered the official
representatives of governments, which in the Chief Justice's time were
frequently monarchies. He believed that any affront to emissaries'

of China, 348 U.S. 356, 359 (1955); International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553, 565 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th
Cir. 1981).
35. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 136-37.
36. Id. at 136.
37. Id. at 137.
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dignity could constitute an insult to the king or prince they reprerelations
sented, with potentially disturbing effects on international
38
and damage to the foreign policy of the host country.
Finally, Marshall reasoned that any nation which sends emissaries,
dignitaries, or military personnel abroad cannot have an intention of
subjecting such persons to the authority of a foreign power. The very
purpose of their mission requires independence from the host state and
absolute allegiance to the home government. The host state's consent
to receive such persons implies a consent to extend the rights and
privileges necessary for the accomplishment of their mission.39
Sovereign immunity should thus be seen as a principle founded on
the express or implied consent of each host country, extended for
policy reasons. At the time Chief Justice Marshall wrote, those policy
reasons were persuasive primarily as a matter of comity and mutual
intercourse, in that each nation wished to secure for itself the benefits
it extended to other states. Mutual consent to grant immunity had
thus reached the status of custom and general practice among nations.
As Marshall pointed out, however, that consent could be withdrawn
at any time if the host country considered it expedient. Marshall
required only that such denial of immunity be effected upon advance
notice. Notice was necessary because the practice of extending immunity was so widespread40 that other nations were justified in expecting it
as a matter of course.
Chief Justice Marshall's analysis of sovereign immunity should be
viewed as distinguishing between its conceptual framework and its
underlying policy objectives. The conceptual basis of sovereign immunity has remained constant. 41 Sovereign immunity is founded on the
consent of the host country. States continue to consider themselves
entitled to withdraw or alter the terms of their consent to immunity. 42 Governments have treated the granting of such consent as a
political bargaining chip to be given or withheld to influence the
conduct of other nations. 43 Governments have also considered it
38. Id. at 137-39.
39. Id. at 139, 143.
40. Id. at 137.
41. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 416-18 (1979). In this case the Court held,
in an interstate context, that California was free to withdraw the immunity that it
had in the past extended to Nevada as a matter of comity. Id. at 418. The Court
emphasized the sovereignty of each state as the basis of its freedom to extend or deny
immunity to another state. Id. at 425-27; cf. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional
de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 762 (1972) (presumption of sovereign immunity granted to
foreign sovereigns absent explicit declaration to the contrary); Comment, The American Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity: An Historical Analysis, 13 Vill. L. Rev. 583,
584-87 (1968) (same) [hereinafter cited as The American Doctrine].
42. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 416 (1979); Lauterpacht, supra note 3, at
239, 269; von Mehren, supra note 4, at 35-36.
43. See Rich v. Naviera Vacuba S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961) (per curiam).
In Naviera Vacuba, the State Department issued a suggestion of immunity In a
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appropriate to withdraw their consent when the nation claiming

immunity was an "unfriendly" power. 44 Thus, Marshall's view of
sovereign immunity as a voluntary waiver of absolute territorial

power has been accepted and has remained essentially intact as the
proper framework.

By contrast, the policy reasons underlying sovereign immunity have
changed significantly since The Schooner Exchange was decided.4 5 In

Marshall's opinion, the principle of immunity primarily served the
diplomatic realities of his time, in which equality and respect among
nations were essential for political stability. The contemporary policy

underlying sovereign immunity, however, is to mutually protect essential governmental functions from harassing and interfering litiga-

tion. 46 Nations are now active in numerous international areas other
than diplomacy. It is essential that activities in the military, eco-

nomic, and political spheres be protected from infringement by private persons, at least to the extent that they are related to important
public and governmental functions. 47 Additionally, the egalitarian
policies emphasized by Marshall are less persuasive and less important

today because intercourse among nations is now conducted from a
perspective of "realpolitik" that reflects differences in status. More-

over, dignity and honor are not of great import for non-monarchical
governments that are essentially devoid of personality.

The remarkable endurance of Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in
The Schooner Exchange lies not in its articulation of policy-for that

has changed sustantially-but in its creation of a coherent framework
in legal and political theory for the concept of sovereign immunity.

clearly commercial case as to which the defendant, Cuba, had previously waived
immunity. Id. at 26. The State Department's suggestion was given in return for
Cuba's release of a hijacked airliner. ProposedDraft Legislation, supra note 4, at 312
n.49.
44. See Dade Drydock Corp. v. M/T Mar Caribe, 199 F. Supp. 871, 874 (S.D.
Tex. 1961). In Mar Caribe, Cuba was not allowed to plead sovereign immunity
because diplomatic relations with the United States had been severed.
45. Jurisdictional Immunity, supra note 3, at 1163-65, 1169-70; see Alfred
Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695-705 (1976); Bishop, New United
States Policy Limiting Sovereign Immunity, 47 Am. J. Int'l L. 93, 104-06 (1953);
Lauterpacht, supra note 3, at 230-31. For an extensive historical and policy treatment, see Harvard Law School, Draft Convention of the Competence of Courts in
Regard to Foreign States, 26 Am. J. Int'l L. 451 (Supp. 1932). See generally Von
Mehren, supra note 4, at 37-43 (shift towards restrictive doctrine).
46. Comment, Judicial Adoption of Restrictive Immunity for Foreign Sovereigns, 51 Va. L. Rev. 316, 321-24 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Adoption]; see
Friedmann, Some Impacts of Social Organization on InternationalLaw, 50 Am. J.
Int'l L. 475 (1956); Lauterpacht, supra note 3, at 226-41; Schreuer, Some Recent
Developments in the Law of State Immunity, 2 Comp. L.Y.B. 215 (1978).
47. Friedmann, supra note 46, at 480. Friedmann reduces the range of protected
government activities to a "hard core of an irreducible minimum of government
activities." Id. (emphasis omitted).
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Fluctuations of policy thus do not disturb the concept that a foreign
state's immunity exists only by consent of the host country. United
States courts over the course of time have been able to advance a
variety of justifications for the existence of sovereign immunity, yet
have always referred to the reasoning of The Schooner Exchange.48
3. Comparison of Immunity in Municipal and International Law
While sovereign immunity in international law has withstood substantial changes and yet remained essentially the same in effect, municipal immunity has been weakened substantially. It is, therefore,
instructive to briefly compare the two doctrines.
Municipal immunity is an absolute concept considered inherent in
the nature of government. Because the reasons for its existence are
eminently practical, such as the difficulty of compelling the king to
appear in his own court, both medieval and modern writers consider
immunity a central and indispensable aspect of government.40 International sovereign immunity, by comparison, is a relative concept. It
is not inherent in or necessary to the international order or the interaction among states, but rather depends entirely on the willingness of
each nation to cede part of its territorial power. The concept permits
negation of the privilege it embodies in that any nation can reassert its
territorial prerogative by subjecting a foreign state to judicial
process. 50
Municipal immunity, through legislation and judicial practice, has
been eroded to a far greater extent than foreign states' immunity.
Most legal systems have consented to great curtailments of immunity
by developing numerous means by which citizens can bring almost
any legal action against their own government. 5 Sovereign immu48. See Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 571-74 (1926), in which
the Court relied heavily on The Schooner Exchange in extending immunity to commercial vessels of foreign states. Thirty years later, the Supreme Court again invoked
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion when it denied immunity to a foreign state from
counterclaims to an action instituted by the foreign state. National City Bank v.
Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 362-65 (1955).
49. Compare Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (municipal
immunity is based "on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal
right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends")
(Holmes, J.) with Blackstone, supra note 17, at *242 ("[N]o suit or action can be
brought against the king . . . . For all jurisdiction implies superiority of power:
authority to try would be vain and idle, without an authority to redress; and the
sentence of a court would be contemptible, unless that court had power to command
the execution of it: but who . . . shall command the king?").
50. See Lauterpacht, supra note 3, at 235. A brief comparison of immunity In
municipal law and international law is provided in Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410,
414-18 (1979), and in Reeves, The Foreign Sovereign Before United States Courts, 38
Fordham L. Rev. 455, 455-79 (1970).
51. See Pock, Systems of Public Responsibility in Switzerland, Germany, and
Austria, 1966 U. Ill. L.F. 1023.
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nity in international law, however, has been eroded only recently and
imperfectly.- 2 Generally, the principle remains a significant obstacle
to suits by private persons against foreign states.
An important similarity between municipal immunity and international immunity is the distinction between concept (form) and policy
(content). Both types of immunity have remained essentially unchanged in their conceptual structure. Municipal immunity is conceptually inherent in the sovereign government which voluntarily may
consent to be sued. International immunity is conceptually derived
from the territorial prerogative of each nation, which voluntarily
relinquishes a part of that power. The constancy of each of those
frameworks, however, has not prevented significant changes in the
policies underlying each type of immunity. The modern policies for
each focus on the smooth administration of government and international relations, whereas formerly immunity was concerned with the
sovereign's power and dignity.
The foregoing observations raise an important question about international sovereign immunity. As noted, the modern policies underlying the two types of immunity are remarkably similar. At the same
time, international immunity appears to be a more relative concept
than municipal immunity, because it is dependent on each host state's
relinquishment of territorial power. The question arises why the
weaker concept of international immunity has not eroded to the same
extent as its stronger counterpart in the municipal context. One might
expect that the similar modern policies underlying the two immunities
would cause a similar pattern of erosion. Nevertheless, international
immunity has retained far greater influence than municipal immunity.
That discrepancy may, in large part, be due to the differences
between the national and the international legal order. The existence
of a sovereign lawgiver in the nation-state permits waivers of immunity to develop on a rational and consistent basis. Moreover, municipal immunity has a history of governmental consent to suit by virtue
of the English "petition of right" to the king.53 The international
order, by comparison, lacks a supreme sovereign and operates in the
anarchical system of nations. That lack, combined with the natural
vagaries of a principle based largely on custom and comity, has
greatly impeded a rational progression towards the abandonment of
sovereign immunity.
International sovereign immunity has certainly eroded to some extent, as evidenced by the shift from the absolute to the restrictive
doctrine. This shift, however, occurred in a random manner. Moreover, a closer examination of this shift suggests a new and more
52. See Reeves, supra note 50, at 469.
53. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
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rational approach to international immunity and the promotion of

policies that resemble those operative in municipal immunity.
B. The Absolute Doctrine and the Restrictive Doctrine
1. Major Differences
Sovereign immunity was traditionally a firm rule prohibiting suit
against a foreign state under any circumstances, except by its consent.
More recently, some countries began to recognize exceptions to the

rule. Thus developed two versions of sovereign immunity, the "abso-

lute" rule and the "restrictive" rule.5 4 The latter is now accepted by
the vast majority of states, but the distinction remains important as an
analytical tool. s5
The restrictive view would extend immunity to foreign states only
for legal actions arising out of certain types of acts. In order to
distinguish acts entitled to immunity from those that are actionable,
the restrictive doctrince recognizes acta jure imperii and acta jure

gestionis. The former label designates acts of a governmental nature,
whereas the latter means acts of a commerical or private nature.

Immunity is granted only with respect to acts of public character.
Various tests have been formulated to categorize the acts of foreign
states according to their public or private character. The two most

commonly used tests focus, respectively, on the nature and the purpose of the activity in question. 57 The "nature" test, for example,

would deny immunity from legal actions arising out of an ordinary
commerical contract, even if the contract had been concluded for the
purpose of procuring governmental goods, such as military equipment. The "purpose" test would grant immunity if such a contract

had a public purpose, but might deny immunity in the case of a
governmental regulation intended to have a commercial effect. 8

54. See Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 698-705 (1976); Judicial
Adoption, supra note 46, at 316-20. See generally von Mehren, supra note 4, at 37-43
(references to the laws of other countries regarding sovereign immunity); Weber,
supra note 4, at 18-19 (same).
55. The importance of the distinction is not merely theoretical, however, for
socialist countries still adhere to the absolute rule. See Erickson, Soviet Theory of the
Legal Nature of CustomaryInternationalLaw, 7 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 148 (1975).
See generally M. Boguslavskij, Staatliche Immunit t (1965) (one of the major works
on the socialist version of sovereign immunity).
56. See Lauterpacht, supra note 3, at 220-25.
57. See Pugh & McLaughlin, supra note 3; see aLso Restatement (Second) of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 69 (1965).
58. CompareRoumania v. Guaranty Trust Co., 250 F. 341 (2d Cir.) ("purpose"
test used to grant immunity for purchase of army boots), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 663
(1918) with Judgment of Mar. 13, 1926, Corte cass., Italy, 1926 Foro It. I 584,
1925-1926 Ann. Dig. 179 (No. 128) ("nature" test used to deny immunity on same
purchase contract).
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Another line of thought eschews both the "nature" test and the
"purpose" test and opts for identifying specific activities that will be
immune from judicial inquiry.59 Actions not falling within the categories identified will not be entitled to immunity. The exempted areas
of government activity include such public functions as diplomacy,
military operations, and internal administrative acts.
Finally, one scholar argued that a government's acts should be
considered public only when a private person would be incapable of
performing them. 60 Thus virtually any contract, including debt instruments issued by a government, would be actionable because private persons are able to enter into such transactions. The set of immune activities would be reduced to legislative, military, and similar
functions.
The absolute doctrine avoids the difficult distinctions sought to be
made by the foregoing tests. It simply extends immunity to activities
by a foreign state, irrespective of their public or private nature, unless
the state has waived immunity.6 ' Because all acts of a government
are by definition "governmental" and serve a public purpose, however
indirectly, the proponents of this view argue that the public-private
distinction is untenable and that all activities by governments should
be immune.
2. Underlying Policies
The dual problems of absolute versus restrictive doctrine and public
versus private acts have been thought to hinge on the proper definition of governmental acts. 62 That perception, while not necessarily
incorrect, has obscured more fundamental problems, the solution of
which would have aided in defining a governmental act for purposes
of sovereign immunity. No inquiry has been made comparing the
respective policies that are served by the different versions of the
restrictive doctrine. The results of such an inquiry would have redirected the arguments from their focus on terminology and concepts to
the crucial issue of which underlying policy best serves the contemporary international political and economic order.
59. See Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965); Goodman,
supra note 3; JudicialAdoption, supra note 46; infra notes 112-122 and accompanying text.
60. Weiss, Compitence ou Incompdtence des Tribunaux 6 l'egard des otats
Etrangers, 1923 Hague Academy Int'l L. receuil des Cours 525, 546 (1923): see
Lauterpacht, supra note 3, at 225.
61. See Garcfa-Mora, supra note 3, at 339-54; see also Lauterpacht, supra note 3,
at 222-30 (good comparison of the absolute and the restrictive doctrine); Jurisdictional Immunity, supra note 3, at 1160-63 (same).
62. See Fensterwald, Sovereign Immunity and Soviet State Trading, 63 Harv. L.
Rev. 614, 615-24 (1950); Lauterpacht, supra note 3, at 222-25.
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It may be unfair to suggest that no one has attempted an analysis of
the policies underlying sovereign immunity. Several commentators
have correctly identified the inapplicability of the policies inherent in
the absolute doctrine to contemporary international relations. 3 In
their analysis, the absolute version of sovereign immunity reflects a
deep concern with the dignity and inviolability of foreign states. That
concern was appropriate, and even necessary, at a time when stability
in the international order depended heavily upon mutual respect and
equality among states. Moreover, they reasoned, nations rarely engaged in commerical activities that would expose large numbers of
private individuals to potential loss. Consequently, political concerns
naturally dominated the minimal private interests. While these factors justified the absolute doctrine in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, these critics recognized that they were inapplicable or
substantially changed today. Thus, they advocated moving away
from the absolute doctrine towards the restrictive doctrine, accommodating new conditions and growing private interests. 4
Scholars who advocated this analysis, however, failed in two major
respects. First, they did not place their analysis in the context of Chief
Justice Marshall's theoretical framework set forth in The Schooner
Exchange. Second, they neglected to include a systematic evaluation
of the policies inherent in different versions of the restrictive doctrine.
The failure to refer back to Marshall's schema in The Schooner
Exchange weakens the policy argument in favor of the restrictive
doctrine. The Chief Justice premised the existence of immunity on the
consent of the host country and allowed for the possibility of a later
withdrawal of such consent. Moreover, he recognized specific policy
reasons, operative in limited situations, for which immunity was extended among nations. That theory permits a host country to extend
immunity upon any conditions it may choose and to alter those conditions at will. 05
The restrictive doctrine can thus be accommodated within Marshall's schema. Changing circumstances in the international order
create issues different from those recognized by Marshall. Accordingly, it bears examination whether a host country should change the
conditions upon which it extends immunity in order to account for the
new situations. That examination is embodied in the policy analysis
that discredits the absolute doctrine and indicates that immunity
should be extended under a more restrictive rule.

63. See, e.g., Bishop, supra note 45; Fensterwald, supra note 62; Friedmann,
supra note 46; Garcia-Mora, supra note 3; Lauterpacht, supra note 3; Lowenfeld 11,
supra note 3; Timberg I, supra note 3.
64. See Garcia-Mora, supra note 3, at 343-54. But see Weber, supra note 4, at 81
n.124 (listing several authors who advocated adherence to the absolute rule).
65. See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
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The great flexibility of Chief Justice Marshall's framework facilitates a shift to the restrictive doctrine. By emphasizing the consent of
the host country, Marshall permits changes in the conditions of that
consent without affecting the basic framework of immunity. In effect,
his concept of sovereign immunity can account for vastly different
policies over a period of time without damage to its basic structure,
simply by changing its attendant conditions. Thus, adoption of the
restrictive doctrine does not constitute a fundamental change in sovereign immunity, but merely alters its conditions in response to new
circumstances that require new policies.
Viewed in this light, the shift from the absolute to the restrictive
doctrine is a relatively modest change that does not threaten the basic
concept of sovereign immunity. Indeed, other countries have accomplished the change with little difficulty, without losing sight of the
importance of sovereign immunity. 66 American courts, however, dogmatically adhered to the absolute doctrine on the basis of precedent
until 1952, invoking the limited power of the judiciary in matters of
67
foreign policy.
The failure to apply Chief Justice Marshall's schema, however, is
far less serious than the failure to analyze thoroughly the policies
inherent in different forms of the restrictive doctrine. The American
law of sovereign immunity has never developed a unified and coherent view of the restrictive doctrine because it lacked a thorough policy
analysis. Indeed, that failure is reflected even in the FSIA version of
restrictive immunity, which is based on a simplistic and superficial
analysis of the operative policies. 68
The policy underlying the restrictive doctrine should not be summarized in the formula that private interests should be protected in a
world of increasing trade between private persons and foreign
states.69 Although that characterization is not incorrect, it is misleading. Its generality and one-sidedness fails to account for the subtle

66. For discussions of the restrictive doctrine in other countries, see S. Sucharitkul, supra note 3; Castel, Immunity of a Foreign State from Execution: French
Practice,46 Am. J. Int'l L. 520 (1952); Lalive, L'Itmnunite de Juridiction des ktats
et des Organisationsinternationales,[1953] III Hague Academy Int'l L. Recueil des
Cours 205 (1953); Lauterpacht, supra note 3.
67. See Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 170, 215
A.2d 864, 881 (Musmanno; J., dissenting), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 822 (1966). But see
Cardozo, Judicial Deference to State Department Suggestions: Recognition of Prerogative or Abdication to Usurper?, 48 Corn. L.Q. 461 (1963).
68. See infra notes 252-273 and accompanying text.
69. In Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976), the Court described
the policy supporting the restrictive view as assuring "those engaging in commercial
transactions with foreign sovereignties that their rights will be determined in the
courts whenever possible." Id. at 699. The Court also made reference to "the enormous increase in the extent to which foreign sovereigns had become involved in
international trade." Id. at 702.
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balancing of competing interests that should be the real thrust of the
restrictive doctrine. In general form, those interests are the need of
foreign states to discharge their major functions free from harassing
litigation and the desire of private individuals to have their claims
against foreign states adjudicated according to law. These interests
conflict whenever the adjudication of a private claim against a foreign
state interferes in the latter's functions. The major policy objective of
the restrictive doctrine should be to translate, in principled fashion,
that general formulation into concrete results. That objective is
achieved by identifying the conflict situations, as well as the specific
competing interests, and resolving the conflict in favor of the
weightier interests.
An examination of the basic structure of the restrictive doctrine
reveals that its thrust is toward that objective. Any restrictive rule
identifies certain situations in which the governmental interest prevails and others in which the private interest is deemed more important. For example, one version of the restrictive doctrine extends
immunity to foreign states against legal action arising from their
public debt. 70 Arguably, that result is based on the premise that
litigation over public debt raises a fundamental conflict of interestsvindication of the private claim and non-interference in governmental
functions. That conflict is resolved in favor of the latter because
raising money is a sufficiently important public function to outweigh
the private interest in recovery on claims against the foreign state.
Another version of the restrictive doctrine, extending immunity only
for acts that cannot be performed by private persons, would permit
legal action concerning public debt. 7' Accordingly, that doctrine
can be described as balancing the competing interests differently.
Each version of the restrictive doctrine can be analyzed in terms of
such balancing judgments. That analysis, however, has never been
undertaken. Therefore, the different ways of resolving conflict situations were never precisely and systematically identified, and an effective policy comparison of the various versions was impossible. Moreover, the lack of an examination of those policy judgments hindered
the development of a more finely tuned restrictive rule that would
reflect a careful balancing of the competing interests. Instead, the
restrictive doctrine became a rough rule of thumb that relied on the
inadequate "public" and "private" labels. The doctrine did not articulate the underlying delicate balancing process; much less did it consciously work with that process.

70. See Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965). But see
Goodman, supra note 3, at 904 (criticism of public debt criterion).
71. See von Mehren, supra note 4, at 49, 54.
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While the balancing of competing interests should be the major
policy objective of sovereign immunity, a secondary policy should be
to promote a coherent and stable international legal order. Successful
implementation of this policy would facilitate interaction and trade
among states and between states and private persons. Accordingly,
the restrictive doctrine should be cast in the form of a clear rule that
affords predictable results and conveys a sense of fairness and consistency. American scholars and judges have recognized
this secondary
72
objective, but have generally failed to implement it.

In summary, the restrictive doctrine should be viewed as a particular conception of sovereign immunity, formed within the framework
created by Marshall. It embodies a policy responsive to new social and
political conditions and is conceptually based on the right of a host
country to change the terms of its consent to foreign states' immunity.
Most nations have adopted the restrictive doctrine; thus, it may appear unnecessary to justify it by reference to Marshall's theoretical
framework or by a detailed analysis of its policy objectives. The
usefulness of the above discussion, however, lies in its applicability to
future problems that will require refinements and corollaries in the
law of sovereign immunity. Although widely accepted, the restrictive
doctrine is far from being a uniform and easily applicable rule.
II.

MAJOR PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

A. Dominance of the Executive Branch
At an early date, United States courts developed the practice of
seeking advice from the executive branch of the government on questions of sovereign immunity. 3 As early as The Schooner Exchange V.
McFaddon,74 the Supreme Court made reference to the special power
of the executive in matters of foreign relations.75 Chief Justice Marshall gave no indication, however, that advice from the executive
branch would count as more than one of many factors in the Court's
decision. Nonetheless, subsequent cases gave increasing weight to ex72. See, e.g., Lowenfeld II, supra note 3, at 927-28. Professor Lowenfeld had
been with the State Department from 1961 to 1966, holding the position of Deputy
Legal Adviser from 1964 to 1966. He was heavily involved in sovereign immunity
cases and prepared a study identifying the defects in the American approach and
suggesting a new approach. Id. at 901. Five years later, Professor Lowenfeld again
became involved in a sovereign immunity case, that time as counsel to the defending
foreign state. In an article based on that experience, he noted many of the same
defects in American law. Lowenfeld I, supra note 3, at 423-36.
73. See Ex Parte Muir, 254 U.S. 522, 533 (1921), and cases cited therein. On the
issue of executive dominance in foreign relations, see Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-37 (1964), and Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S.
297, 302-03 (1918).
74. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
75. Id. at 146-47.
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ecutive suggestions of immunity, until a series of Supreme Court
decisions established conclusively that State Department suggestions

should be followed without an independent judicial inquiry.70 Executive allowance of a foreign state's immunity77was therefore given
effect irrespective of the factual circumstances.

This practice was based in part on the view that the executive had a

constitutionally mandated prerogative of action in the field of foreign
relations,78 and in part on a reluctance to embarrass the executive

branch in its conduct of foreign policy.7 9 Courts were considered an
inappropriate forum in which to adjudicate controversies implicating
foreign affairs and calling for sensitive political judgments. Thus,

courts increasingly referred litigants suing foreign states to "diplomatic channels" for the vindication of their claims. 80

A distinct body of legal rules developed concerning the procurement and effect of State Department suggestions of sovereign immunity. At the initial stage of litigation, a defendant government had a
choice of where to raise its claim of immunity."' It might choose not
to request a State Department recognition of immunity, thus leaving
the court free to make its own inquiry on whether the requirements of
sovereign immunity had been met. 82 In that situation, it was unclear
whether courts were bound to apply State Department policy on

sovereign immunity
or whether they could apply the law as they
83
understood it.
76. See Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 38 (1945); Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578,
587 (1943); Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima v. Navemar, 303 U.S. 68,
74 (1938); Ex Parte Muir, 254 U.S. 522, 532-33 (1921).
77. See Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 215 A.2d
864, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 822 (1966). This case has a thorough discussion of State
Department suggestions, both for and against the rule of executive dominance. The
case involved expropriation and confiscation, affecting various contracts and damaging plaintiffs in an amount over $116,000,000. The case was dismissed, over strong
dissent, based on an executive suggestion. Id. at 161-62, 215 A.2d at 877.
78. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964); OetJen
v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918); von Mehren, supra note 4, at 40.
But cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (courts can resolve questions of
international and national law regarding foreign states).
79. See Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945); von Mehren, supra note 4, at
40.
80. See Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34 (1945).
81. See Lowenfeld I, supra note 3, for an extensive analysis of the strategy of
foreign states in raising the defense of sovereign immunity.
82. Id. at 389-95. In the case discussed by Professor Lowenfeld, Haiti decided not
to request immunity through the State Department. See Proposed Draft Legislation,
supra note 4, at 317-22.
83. See Weber, supra note 4, at 17. Compare Amkor Corp. v. Bank of Korea,
298 F. Supp. 143, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (denial of immunity required by State
Department inaction) with Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abasteclmientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 358-59 (2d Cir. 1964) (State Department
inaction leaves court to conduct independent inquiry), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934
(1965).
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Alternatively, a defendant might choose to press its claim of immunity through the State Department, which had developed a set of
administrative procedures for making determinations of immunity.84
These included adversarial hearings, the submission of briefs, and
deliberations by panels of State Department officials. The losing

party, however, could not obtain administrative or judicial review.
Moreover, the Department was under no obligation to articulate the

reasoning behind its decisions.8 5

Many commentators severely criticized the role of the State Depart-

ment on questions of sovereign immunity.86 They charged that the
Department's internal methods were deficient; suggestions of immunity were thought to be issued in accordance with political expedi-

ency, without regard for consistency and principle.87 Moreover, because the Department generally failed to articulate its reasons for

reaching a decision,88 litigants were unable to utilize precedent to

form a coherent strategy in presenting their case. Additionally, because decisions could not be reviewed within the Department or by

the judiciary, plaintiffs had no recourse after immunity was granted
and felt frustrated by their impotence in the face of the unexplained
rejections of their arguments.
The most poignant example of these problems was the inadequacy

of the so-called Tate Letter 9 as a guiding policy. The Tate Letter,
84. See Belman, New Departuresin the Law of Sovereign Immunity, 1969 Am.
Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 182, 185-86; Cardozo, Sovereign Immunity: The Plaintiff Deserves a Day in Court, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 608, 617 (1954); Lowenfeld I, supra note 3,
at 391-94; von Mehren, supra note 4, at 41. See generally, Panel, Litigating the
Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns: Selected Problems of Presenting Your Case in the
Courts and the Executive Branch, 1976 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 41 (collected comments regarding the FSIA's impact on suits against foreign governments).
85. See Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614, 619 (5th Cir. 1974).
86. See, e.g., Deak, The Plea of Sovereign Immunity and the New York Court of
Appeals, 40 Colum. L. Rev. 453, 462-63 (1940); Jessup, Has the Supreme Court
Abdicated One of Its Functions?, 40 Am. J. Int'l L. 168, 169 (1946); Timberg I,
supra note 3, at 115-16.
87. See, e.g., Timberg, Sovereign Immunity and Act of State Defenses: Transnational Boycotts and Economic Coercion, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 11 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Timberg II]; Timberg, Wanted: Administrative Safeguardsfor the Protection of the Individualin InternationalEconomic Regulation, 17 Ad. L. Rev. 159, 163
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Timberg III]; Note, Tile Sovereign's Immunity and
Private Property:A Due Process Problem, Geo. L.J. 2,84, 292-98 (1961).
88. See Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614, 616 (5th Cir. 1974). In this case, plaintiff
had requested a statement of reasons from the State Department for its decision to
allow immunity. The Department responded that it had considered "'all the circumstances"' and had consulted with "'other interested bureaus and officials.' Id. at
616.
89. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser of the Department of State,
to the Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), in 26 Dep't State Bull. 984 (1952)
[hereinafter cited as Tate Letter]; quoted in Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S.
682, 711-15 (1976). The letter advised the Justice Department that henceforth the
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published by the State Department in 1952, purported to adopt the
restrictive doctrine of sovereign immunity. Although viewed and intended as a major shift in United States policy and legal practice, the
Tate Letter proved problematic because it provided no criteria for the
implementation and application of the new policy.Y0 Moreover, the
Tate Letter failed to state the Department's position on a number of
subsidiary issues, such as seizures of property, that might have been
affected by adoption of the restrictive doctrine."' The inadequacy of
the Tate Letter, coupled with the courts' traditional deference to State
Department policy, created a dilemma for judges. They saw them-

selves bound by the policy enunciated in the letter, but were unable to
extract therefrom any specific principles to guide their decisions."
The State Department failed to resolve that dilemma in subsequent
determinations of immunity and statements of policy. In a few decisions, the Department expressly and soundly followed the general rule
of the Tate Letter.9 3 The majority of its decisions, however, did not
fall into any discernible pattern and were variously consistent or
inconsistent with the Tate Letter. 9 4 For example, suggestions of immunity were issued in some clearly commercial cases05 and in in-

stances where immunity had been waived by the defendant government. 96
State Department would "follow the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in the
consideration of requests of foreign governments for a grant of sovereign immunity."
Tate Letter, supra, 985; see also Bishop, supra note 46 (commenting on the change to
the restrictive doctrine).
90. See Ocean Transp. Co. v. Ivory Coast, 269 F. Supp. 703, 705 (E.D. La.
1967); von Mehren, supra note 4, at 41; Comment, International Law-Sovereign
Immunity-The FirstDecade of the Tate Letter Policy, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 1142, 1147
(1962).
91. See Drachsler, Some Observationson the Current Status of the Tate Letter,
54 Am. J. Int'l L. 790 (1960); Myers, Contemporary Practice of the United States
Relating to InternationalLaw, 54 Am. J. Int'l L. 632 (1960).
92. See Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Tran.
sportes, 336 F.2d 354, 359 (2d. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
93. See, e.g., Ocean Transp. Co. v. Ivory Coast, 269 F. Supp. 703, 704 n.1
(E.D. La. 1967) (State Department refused to suggest immunity because breach of
contract is a commercial act); Waltier v. Thomson, 189 F. Supp. 319, 320 (S.D.N.Y.
1960) (State Department allowed immunity for a governmental act by a Canadian
immigration officer).
94. See Dobrovir, A Gloss on the Tate Letter's Restrictive Theory of Sovereign
Immunity, 54 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1968); Note, The American Law of Sovereign Immunity Since the Tate Letter, 4 Va. J. Int'l L. 75 (1964) [hereinafter cited as The
American Law of Sovereign Immunity].
95. E.g., Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961) (per
curiam); Aerotrade, Inc. v. Haiti, 376 F. Supp. 1281 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
96. E.g., Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971); Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24
(4th Cir. 1961); see Comment, Sovereign Immunity: The Effect of Executive Intervention on the Restrictive Theory and Waiver, Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President
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The foregoing problems could have been largely corrected without
changing the basic scheme of judicial deference to executive policy.
The Department might have improved its inadequate quasi-judicial
procedure by publicizing the grounds of its decisions and granting
review in some cases. Moreover, it could have issued guidelines in the
nature of regulations to advise potential litigants of the circumstances
in which a defense of sovereign immunity would be upheld. The State
Department could also have instituted an internal policy of basing
decisions primarily on long-term legal and policy goals rather than
immediate political objectives.
Those measures, however, would not have addressed a more fundamental criticism attacking the very basis of judicial deference to executive suggestions. Some scholars argue that the courts are charged
with deciding cases arising under United States law and that the
separation of powers doctrine does not require wholesale abdication
of judicial action in the area of sovereign immunity. 7 As a rule of
international law, sovereign immunity forms part of United States
law. Therefore, the courts are in the first instance responsible for its
application.
Critics have also observed that it is not unusual for courts to exercise
a high degree of power in other areas touching upon foreign relations. 98 Judges easily apply principles of international law and decide
cases with foreign elements. For example, cases arising under the Act
of State doctrine are decided by the judiciary which will sometimes
receive non-binding advice from the State Department."9 Because
those cases are not considered to involve sufficient foreign relations
implications to require judicial abdication, sovereign immunity likevise should not be treated as intimately affecting American foreign
policy.
Moreover, it is argued that sovereign immunity does not touch upon
foreign relations as closely as has been supposed. It has become increasingly acceptable in the international legal order to subject foreign states to legal process. Thus, denial of immunity rarely disrupts
or seriously affects foreign relations. Accordingly, the executive
of India (2d Cir. 1971), 11 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 334, 339 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Effect of Executive Intervention]: Note, International Law-Sovereign Inmunity-The Last Straw in Judicial Abdication, 46 Tul. L. Rev. 841, 843-44 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as The Last Straw].
97. See Dickinson, The Law of Nations as National Law: "'PoliticalQuestions."
104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 451, 469-79 (1956); Franck, The Courts. The State Department
and National Policy: A Criterion for Judicial Abdication, 44 Minn. L. Rev. 1101
(1960); Jessup, supra note 86.
98. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino. 376 U.S. 398, 439-72 (1964)
(White, J., dissenting), Dickinson, supra note 97; Note, Sovereign Immunity, Tupra
note 4, at 452-53.
99. See Note, The Nonviable Act of State Doctrine: A Change in the Perception
of the Foreign Act of State, 38 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 725, 733-34 (1977).
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branch should have little interest in the administration of sovereign
immunity. Indeed, this argument may lead to the conclusion that the
separation of powers doctrine not only permits, but requires, exclusive
judicial responsibility in this area. 00
Although sovereign immunity law as developed in the United States
touched closely upon foreign relations, it was possible, and desirable,
to remove the principle from that domain. In effect, the dominance of
the State Department rendered the foreign relations implications of
sovereign immunity a self-fulfilling prophecy. Because the Department had a natural inclination to exert its influence in this area for
political ends, sovereign immunity increasingly became an instrument
of foreign policy. Thus, it became nearly impossible to counter the
argument that the foreign relations elements of sovereign immunity
required a strong executive role, at least for policy reasons, if not also
as a constitutional matter. By curtailing the State Department role,
however, sovereign immunity could be restored to the status of an
international legal principle of neutral application rather than a doctrine subject to the vagaries of foreign policy 101
Underlying these problems was a basic schism in the American view
of sovereign immunity. The arguments supporting judicial dominance
saw the principle as a rule of international law, to be adjudiciated by
02
the courts like any other legal rule upon a determination of facts.1
The opposite view held that sovereign immunity is a flexible concept
operative in international political relations. 10 3 The major source of
difficulty was that the State Department clung to the latter view, but
was forced to cast its foreign policy decisions regarding sovereign
immunity in the vocabulary and process of the law, because the
question of immunity always arises in the context of cases pending in
the courts. The result was an incoherent body of rules claiming legal
status but manipulated for political ends, and lacking essential attributes of law, such as certainty, generality and neutrality. These complex and problematic relations between the State Department and the
judiciary were abruptly terminated in 1977, when the FSIA shifted to
the courts exclusive
responsibility for adjudicating claims of sovereign
immunity. 04
100. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 450-51 (1964)(White,
J., dissenting). The majority conceded that a high degree of consensus on rules of
international law renders it appropriate for the judiciary to decide a case. Id. at 428.
In Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 704-05 (1976), Justice White, writing
for the majority, noted the international consensus regarding rules on commercial
dealings of private parties. He believed that these established rules were properly
applied by courts to the commercial transactions of a sovereign state. See generally R.
Falk, The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order (1964).
101. See Timberg II, upra note 87, at 11.
102. See Timberg I, supra note 3.
103. See Cardozo, supra note 67.
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976); see infra pt. 111(A)(1).
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B. Distinction Between Public and PrivateActs

Prior to 1977, however, the courts were absolutely bound by a State

Department suggestion of immunity. The executive decision would
override, for example, a prior waiver of immunity on the part of the

defendant government.

05

A State Department recognition of immu-

nity was binding on the courts even if it was plainly contrary to the

Department's
previously announced policies on sovereign immu06
nity.1
If the Department declined to suggest immunity, the courts were
largely left to their own devices. Some courts took the position that the
executive's non-recognition of a claim of immunity was as binding on
the judiciary as a suggestion of immunity and required a denial of

immunity. 10 7 This position was arguably legitimate if the Depart-

ment held hearings and took evidence in the case, thus creating a
semblance of meeting due process requirements.' 0 8
Other courts took the view that when the State Department took no
action with respect to a suggestion of immunity, they should conduct

an independent inquiry.' 0 9 Nevertheless, the), gave considerable

weight to the State Department's inaction, reasoning that it indicated

inapplicability of a major policy underlying sovereign immunity,
which they took to be the safeguarding of American foreign relations." 0 The courts, therefore, did not independently consider questions of sovereign immunity, and the State Department's erratic be-

havior prevented the courts from developing sound criteria for
implementing the restrictive doctrine announced in the Tate Let-

ter."' As a result, American legal practice lacked a thorough under105. Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971); see Effect of Executive Intercention, supra note
96; The Last Straw, supra note 96.
106. See Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961) (per curiam);
The American Doctrine, supra note 41, at 599-601. In Renchard v. Humphreys &
Harding, Inc. 381 F. Supp. 382 (D.D.C. 1974), the court stated that Ithe principles
in the Tate letter. . . are not to be viewed as absolute or unyielding; rather, they are
subject to interpretation and change and the Department of State is the proper
organization to give such interpretation." Id. at 385 (footnote omitted).
107. Renchard v. Humphreys & Harding, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 382, 383-84 (D.D.C.
1974); Amkor Corp. v. Bank of Korea, 298 F. Supp. 143, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
108. See Lowenfeld I, supra note 3, at 389-95. But see Spacil v.Crowe, 489 F.2d
614, 619-20 (5th Cir. 1974)(in the area of foreign relations, the judiciary should not
require State Department procedures to meet reasonableness or any other standards).
109. See, e.g., Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba, S.A. v. MIV Ciudad de la
Habana, 335 F.2d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 1964); Pan American Tankers Corp. v. Vietnam, 291 F. Supp. 49, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
110. See Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba, S.A. v. M/V Ciudad de la Habana,
335 F.2d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 1964); Ocean Transp. Co. v. Ivory Coast, 269 F. Supp.
703, 705 (E.D. La. 1967).
111. Among the more confusing instances of State Department and court relations
are Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka, 15 A.D.2d 111, 222 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1961), affid,
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standing of the nuances of the public-private distinction, which is
crucial to effective application of the restrictive doctrine.
A significant breakthrough in the distinction between public and
private acts occurred in 1964 when the Second Circuit decided Victory Transport,Inc. v. ComisariaGeneralde Abastecimientos y Transportes,1 12 In Victory Transport, Judge Smith concluded that in the
absence of a State Department suggestion of immunity, the court was
free to construct its own rules regarding sovereign immunity. He listed
and described certain kinds of activities that he considered governmental or public and declared that foreign states would be entitled to
immunity only from claims arising out of those activities.
These immune governmental activities comprised: (i) internal administrative acts, (ii) legislative acts, (iii) acts concerning the armed
forces, (iv) diplomatic acts, and (v) public loans." 3 Any other types
of acts would be subject to legal action. This schema, of course, was
operative only in cases in which the State Department had not filed a
suggestion of immunity. The court also admitted the possibility that
the Department might
contract or expand the categories described in
4
Victory Transport."
The criteria formulated by Judge Smith were soon accepted by
other courts as a rational and articulate test for implementing the
restrictive doctrine." 5 The case also elicited several comments and
articles in legal periodicals." 6 Victory Transport thus became the
most prominent formulation of the American version of 7sovereign
immunity for cases not decided by the State Department."
A closer examination of Victory Transport reveals that it eschews
both the "purpose" test and the "nature" test for applying the restrictive doctrine. Judge Smith criticized those tests, respectively, as functionally arbitrary and leading to poor results."" In their place, he
attempted to identify in advance certain "strictly political or public

12 N.Y.2d 781, 186 N.E.2d 676, 235 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1962), and Frazier v. Hanover
Bank, 204 Misc. 922, 119 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct.), afJ'd, 281 A.D. 861, 119 N.Y.S.2d
918 (1953).
112. 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
113. Id. at 360.
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Rovin Sales Co. v. Romania, 403 F. Supp. 1298, 1302 (N.D. Ill.
1975); Ocean Transp. Co. v. Ivory Coast, 269 F. Supp. 703, 705 (E.D. La, 1967);
French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 51, 242 N.E.2d 704, 708, 295
N.Y.S.2d 433, 439 (1968).
116. E.g., Goodman, supra note 3; Comment, Sovereign Immunity Restricted to
Non-commercial Activity-Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 63 Mich. L. Rev. 708 (1965); JudicialAdoption, supra note
46.
117. Jet Line Servs. v. M/V. Marsa El Hariga, 462 F. Supp. 1165, 1169 (D. Md.
1978); von Mehren, supra note 4, at 51-52.
118. 336 F.2d at 359.
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acts about which sovereigns have traditionally been quite sensitive.""' 9 This effort to describe particular acts and activities avoids
the troubling vagueness of the terms "public" and "governmental" as
well as the imprecise
distinction between the nature and the purpose
12 0
of an activity.

The major advantage of Judge Smith's approach is its clarity and
ease of application. It permits courts to reach consistent conclusions
without excessive inquiry into the affairs of a defendant state.121
Additionally, the detailed description of categories of immunity allows both private persons and foreign states to predict with reasonable
certainty whether a claim of immunity is likely to be sustained for
various kinds of litigation.
The only significant drawback of Victory Transport is its rigidity.
The clarity and simplicity of its criteria could lead to their mechanistic application with little regard for the conceptual and policy underpinnings of the restrictive doctrine. Strictly applied, Judge Smith's test
would extend immunity to a foreign state for a tortious automobile
accident if the vehicle involved was transporting a diplomatic pouch
at the time of the accident and was thus engaged in an "act concerning diplomatic activity."' 22 The criticism of rigidity can be met,
however, by offering a considered and sensitive application of the
Victory Transport criteria.
Judge Smith correctly recognized that the restrictive doctrine embodies a balancing of the competing interests of private persons and
foreign states. 2 3 His formulation of immune activities constitutes an
accommodation of those competing interests. As a general rule, Victory Transport allows the private interest to prevail and denies immunity. The immunized activities, however, are those traditionally protected by sovereigns. 24 Judge Smith considered the governmental
interest in shielding those sensitive activities from litigation weightier
than the private interest in adjudicating individual claims.
Although the balancing approach underlying Victory Transport is
fundamentally sound, Judge Smith failed to explore it to sufficient
depth. He reasoned, in essence, that (i) the purpose of the restrictive
doctrine is an accommodation of the private interest with the governmental interest, 2 5 (ii) as a general matter the interests of private
119. Id. at 360.
120. Id. at 360 n.lI (citing Lauterpacht, supra note 3,at 225-26).
121. See Lowenfeld I,supra note 3, at 414-15 (the purpose of sovereign immunity
is undercut by excessive inquiry into the facts supporting a claim of immunity).
122. Id. at 430-31 (citing Judgment of Feb. 10, 1961, Supreme Court, Austria, 2
Ob. 243.60, 84 Juristische Bl4tter 43, 40 Int'l L. Rep. 73 (1970) (a case involving a
United States embassy vehicle)).
123. 336 F.2d at 360.

124. Id.
125. Id.
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plaintiffs should prevail, 2 8 and (iii) for certain activities about which
sovereigns are very sensitive, immunity will be extended. 27 He then
described the latter activities without explaining why heightened sensitivity is proper for them, or why their importance is such as to
overcome conflicting private interests. This explanation is crucial because it explores the core of the restrictive doctrine by explicitly
balancing specific governmental interests against specific private interests. Unfortunately, Judge Smith failed to explain why the shielding of internal administrative acts or acts concerning the armed forces
is more important than the vindication of private claims.
Upon reflection, the importance of the activities immunized in
Victory Transport appears obvious, and arguments readily come to
mind to support the judgment that the governmental interest in
shielding these activities from litigation outweighs the private interest.
For example, a government cannot function smoothly and effectively
if its internal administrative acts are constantly threatened by judicial
inquiry at the instigation of private citizens. Similarly, a government's
foreign diplomacy would be substantially hampered if it was made a
potential subject of litigation in foreign courts. Therefore, the interests of private litigants should be discounted as regards vital governmental functions.
Nevertheless, the failure of Victory Transport to articulate and
justify its policy judgments is a serious defect in at least two respects.
First, a detailed explication and justification of the five immune activities might have resulted in more precise descriptions and would
have guided other courts in determining whether a particular activity
falls within the Victory Transport categories. When a court is faced
with an immunity question in a case arising from an automobile
accident in which the vehicle causing injury had been transporting a
diplomatic pouch,'12 8 the problem arises whether the injurious act
concerned diplomatic activity. The resolution of that issue is facilitated by an awareness of the policy factors that lead to immunizing
diplomatic activity."'

126. Judge Smith stated: "We do not think that the restrictive theory. . . requires
sacrificing the interests of private litigants to international comity in other than...
limited categories," Id.
127. Judge Smith concluded that in the absence of a State Department suggestion
he would deny a claim of immunity "unless it is plain that the activity in question
falls within one of the categories of strictly political . . . acts about which sovereigns
have traditionally been quite sensitive." Id.
128. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
129. Professor Lowenfeld suggests two possible solutions. First, to consider the
nature of the activity rather than its purpose as dispositive, or second, to define the
categories of immune activities more precisely. Lowenfeld I, supra note 3, at 431. His
approaches, however, may not go far enough in evaluating the competing interests at
stake. The plaintiff clearly has a substantial interest in recovery, while the foreign
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Second, the formulation of an accurate process of balancing the
competing interests would furnish an important tool for evaluating
other versions of the restrictive doctrine. A sound method of balancing
the private and the governmental interests would provide a means of
analyzing, for example, certain provisions of the FSIA. Such an analysis would answer whether the statute effectively and fairly balanced
those interests, thus furnishing a basis for criticism and possible improvement in the statutory scheme.
Enactment of the FSIA in 1976 significantly diminished the importance of Victory Transport. The public-private distinction, however,
remains a problem that is not completely solved by the statute. The
Victory Transport analysis therefore continues to be influential because of its fundamental understanding of the restrictive doctrine. At
the same time, Judge Smith's failure to push his analysis further
constitutes a missed opportunity to develop a more effective test for
the public-private distinction of the restrictive doctrine.
C. Jurisdiction
1. The Conceptual Framework
The conceptually confused approach taken by the courts towards
jurisdiction, prior to 1977, also caused serious problems. A sound
jurisdictional scheme for actions against foreign states should proceed
from two premises. First, the concept of sovereign immunity is independent from, and compatible with, the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a host country over another state present in its territory. As
Chief Justice Marshall reasoned in The Schooner Exchange,13 0 sovereign states enter upon the territory of another sovereign subject to the
latter's absolute territorial power. The host state extends immunity to
the foreign state voluntarily and can withdraw immunity and reassert
its jurisdiction at any time. 131 Moreover, immunity may be extended
upon such conditions as the host sees fit to impose.' 3 2 Therefore,
personal jurisdiction over a foreign state is in concept freely and
completely within the discretion of the host country.
Second, the concept of jurisdiction has its own underlying policy
goals that should be considered when subjecting a foreign state to
jurisdiction. In the United States, these goals are closely tied to the
requirements of due process and are intended to ensure justice and
state has an insubstantial interest if the car was engaged in any ordinary use. But the
state's interest in immunity might be much greater if the accident resulted from the
driver speeding en route on an urgent diplomatic mission. In that case, immunity
might be appropriate.
130. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812); see supra notes 34-48 and accompanying text.
131. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 136-37; see von Mehren, supra note 4, at 34-36.
132. See Lauterpacht, supra note 3, at 235; von Mehren, supra note 4, at 34-36;
supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
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fairness in the administration of law. Although it may appear self-evident that those requirements are fully applicable when the defendant
is a foreign state, it is less obvious that their application in an international context may lead to different means of establishing personal
jurisdiction. For example, the jurisdictional nexus required within the
United States may have little meaning internationally, thus requiring
the development of new standards when foreign governments are

sued. 133
These premises suggest that the jurisdictional scheme need not be
concerned primarily with issues of sovereign immunity. Instead, it
should in the first instance serve the ordinary policy goals inherent in
jurisdictional principles, adjusted to account for certain special implications of commencing legal action against foreign states. The policies
underlying sovereign immunity should be incorporated secondarily,
and only to the extent compatible with the normal policy objectives of
jurisdictional rules.
Jurisdiction and immunity are thus independent concepts, but are
related by certain mutual policy constraints. The jurisdictional
scheme cannot ignore the policies underlying sovereign immunityrelying purely on an immunity analysis after jurisdiction has been
established-because some of the damage sought to be prevented by
immunity may result from the mere exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdictional attachments of property evidence that possibility, in that the
attachment can substantially interfere in a foreign state's affairs even
if immunity is subsequently established. At the same time, jurisdiction
cannot be collapsed into sovereign immunity, for in that case the
primary goals of the jurisdictional scheme suffer in the effort to promote the policies underlying immunity. The most effective legal structure would thus keep jurisdiction and immunity mutally independent,
but would incorporate some of the latter's objectives into the rules of
the former as secondary aspects. An understanding of that structure
has been absent from courts' jurisdictional analyses in cases against
foreign states.
2. The Courts' Practice
Generally, federal courts have always found a valid basis of subject
matter jurisdiction over actions against foreign states. If plaintiffs
were unable to rely on specific bases, such as admiralty, they could
invoke federal diversity jurisdiction, which extended to actions between "citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign
state."1 34 The FSIA replaced this system in 1977 by3 providing its own
basis of federal subject matter jurisdiction. .
133. See Carl, supra note 4, at 1058-63.
134. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1976).
135. Pub. L. No. 94-583, §§ 2(a), 3, 90 Stat. 2891(1977) (amending 28 U.S.C. §
1332 (1976) and adding 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976)).
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Federal personal jurisdiction, in comparison to subject matter jurisdiction, has, however, presented great difficulties for plaintiffs. '3
The major obstacles to acquiring personal jurisdiction were the lack of
a valid means of service of process' 37 and, less frequently, the absence
of statutory authorization for the court's exercise of personal
jurisdic38
tion, for example, inadequate long-arm provisions.
This situation changed slightly in the 1960's, when courts increasingly found the required statutory authority' 39 and upheld various
means of service of process on an ad hoc basis.' 40 Notwithstanding
the courts' growing liberality, they denied the validity" of the more
innovative attempts to serve process on foreign states. For example,
they rejected the argument that diplomatic and consular missions
should be deemed agents for service of process.' 4 ' Similarly, courts
did not accept the view that foreign states should be treated like
foreign corporations for purposes of extra-territorial service of process
in accordance with state corporation statutes. 42 The FSIA superseded those uneven and sporadic developments by establishing a uniform and exclusive method
of service of process and its own bases of
43
long-arm jurisdiction.
Prior to enactment of the FSIA, the difficulty of acquiring personal
jurisdiction caused plaintiffs to bring actions in rem or quasi in rem
whenever possible. The usual pattern was for plaintiffs to attach

136. See generally Comment, Sovereign Immunity-The Restrictive Theory and
SurroundingJurisdictionalIssues, 15 Cath. U. L. Rev. 234 (1966): Note, Anmenability of Foreign Sovereigns to Federal In Personain Jurisdiction, 14 Va. J. Int'l L. 487
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Amenability of Foreign Sovereigns].
137. See Purdy Co. v. Argentina, 333 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1964); Oster v. Canada,
144 F. Supp. 746 (N.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nom., Clay v. Canada, 238 F.2d 400 (2d Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 936 (1957).
138. See Rovin Sales Co. v. Romania, 403 F. Supp. 1298, 1302-03 (N.D. II. 1975)
(some claims fell within the court's personal jurisdiction, but others did not and had
to be dismissed); Amenability of Foreign Sovereigns, supra note 136, at 493-95.
139. See Republic Int'l Corp. v. Amco Engrs., Inc., 516 F.2d 161, 166-68 (9th
Cir. 1975); Amenability of Foreign Sovereigns, supra note 136, at 493-95.
140. See, e.g., Renchard v. Humphreys & Harding, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 530, 532
(D.D.C. 1973) (upholding service by registered mail to a foreign embassy); Petrol
Shipping Corp. v. Greece, 360 F.2d 103, 107-08 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 931
(1966) (same).
141. See Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Moore, 345 F.2d 978, 980-81 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Purdy Co. v. Argentina, 333 F.2d 95, 97 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 962
(1965); Oster v. Canada, 144 F. Supp. 746, 748-49 (N.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nomn., Clay
v. Canada, 238 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 936 (1957).
142. See Carl, supra note 4, at 1013-14; Pugh & McLaughlin, supra note 3, at
29-30; cf. Vicente v. Trinidad & Tobago, 53 A.D.2d 76, 385 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1976)
(service could not be made extraterritorially, but case dismissed on other grounds),
aff'd, 42 N.Y.2d 929, 366 N.E.2d 1361, 397 N.Y.S.2d 1007(1977).
143. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(b), 1602-1611 (1976).
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property of a foreign state, frequently either a vessel or funds in a
bank account, in order to establish jurisdiction. 44 The issue of immunity was litigated only subsequent to such jurisdictional attachments.
Until 1955, the State Department had followed no particular policy
with regard to jurisdictional attachments of property. In that year,
the Department announced that the restrictive doctrine adopted in
the Tate Letter did not extend to seizures of property. 4 5 Foreign
states were thus absolutely immune from all attachments of property,
including jurisdictional attachments for in rem or quasi in rem
actions. 146 That position, however, was not tenable because it foreclosed the only effective means of bringing foreign governments into
court, thus rendering the restrictive doctrine meaningless. 147 Subsequently, the State Department returned to the practice of permitting
attachments of commercial property for jurisdictional purposes. 4 ,
The concept of personal jurisdiction over a foreign government was
altered by the Second Circuit in Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Greece.'4
In this case, plaintiff brought a personal action against Greece for
breach of a contract of transport, effecting service of process by
ordinary mail to representatives of the defendant's Ministry of Trade
and Ministry of Commerce in the United States. Judge Smith reviewed recent cases and trends in federal procedure and sovereign
immunity and then upheld plaintiff's method of obtaining personal
jurisdiction. 50
Petrol Shipping recognized two conditions of personal jurisdiction,
both deriving from the landmark case, International Shoe Co. v.
Washington.'5 First, the defendant state must be amenable to suit in
the forum by virtue of actual presence, consent, or other contact. The
government of Greece had consented to arbitration in New York in
the event of disputes arising from its contract with plaintiff. The court
found this to be a sufficient nexus under an earlier case that also relied
on consent to arbitration to support personal jurisdiction.15 2 Judge
144. Lowenfeld I, supra note 3, at 386; see Lowenfeld II, supra note 3, at 923-24,.
145. See New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Korea, 132 F. Supp. 684, 687
(S.D.N.Y. 1955) (State Department suggests immunity from attachment where underlying claim and property were commercial).
146. Id. at 686-87.
147. Id. at 687 n.7; see Lowenfeld II, supra note 3, at 908, 921-24.
148. The State Department filed a letter with the court in Weilamann v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 21 Misc. 2d 1086, 1088, 192 N.Y.S.2d 469, 472 (Sup. Ct. 1959),
drawing a distinction between attachment for jurisdictional purposes and attachment for execution purposes.
149. 360 F.2d 103 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966).
150. Id. at 107-10.
151. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
152. 360 F.2d at 107 (citing Farr & Co. v. Cia Intercontinental de Navegacion,
243 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1957)).
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Smith also noted, however, that the defendant maintained an office in
New York,
thus rendering a doctrine of constructive presence unneces53

sary. 1

The second condition was that the defendant must receive adequate

notice of the litigation. 54 Under InternationalShoe, that condition is

satisfied by any method of service "reasonably calculated" to give
notice. 55 The plaintiff in Petrol Shipping had sent a summons to that
branch of the Greek government which was a party to the contract at
issue. Judge Smith found such service consistent with due process.1'5
The most difficult issue that Judge Smith faced was finding authorization for the particular method of service used by plaintiff. He
conceded that Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was not
applicable to a government entity and instead relied on Rule 83 which
permits each district court to regulate its practice and make and
amend its own rules in any manner not inconsistent with the Federal
Rules. Because the local rules of the Southern and Eastern Districts of
New York had a similarly flexible authorization, Judge Smith felt free
to fashion his own rule approving plaintiff's method of service of
process. 15

The court also drew an important conceptual distinction between
personal jurisdiction and sovereign immunity.1 s8 Personal jurisdiction concerns amenability to suit and adequacy of service. A consideration of those factors should proceed independently of an' assessment
of sovereign immunity issues. Only after in personam jurisdiction has
been established does immunity become a proper subject of inquiry. If
jurisdiction does not exist, the court does not reach the question of
immunity. If jurisdiction exists, sovereign immunity becomes a potential ground for relinquishing jurisdiction.15 9
Judge Smith relied on that conceptual distinction by analyzing
personal jurisdiction and sovereign immunity separately. Once he had
determined that the court's exercise of in personam jurisdiction was
valid, he turned to the defendant's claim of immunity. Applying the
Victory Transport criteria, Judge Smith concluded that Greece's act
of entering into a contract did not fall within one of the categories of
immune activities. 60 Therefore, he denied immunity, a result that
153.
154.
155.
156.

360 F.2d at 107.
Id.
326 U.S. at 320.
360 F.2d at 110.

157. Id. at 107-10. A good discussion of this procedural problem is provided in
Renchard v. Humphreys & Harding, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 530 (D.D.C. 1973).
158. 360 F.2d at 107; see supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
159. 360 F.2d at 106; see Smit, The ForeignSovereign Immunities Act of 1976: A
Pleafor DrasticSurgery, 1980 Am. Soc'v Int'l L. Proc. 49, 63 fhereinafter cited as
Smit I].
160. 360 F.2d at 110.
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accorded with the State Department's refusal to suggest immunity
because it also considered the act at issue commercial.' 0 '
Although Petrol Shipping provided a sound analysis of personal
jurisdiction over foreign states, subsequent cases strictly limited the
holding to its facts. For example, courts held that, short of actual
presence, minimum contacts between the forum and a defendant state
exist only when the latter has consented to jurisdiction or arbitration
in the forum.16 2 Similarly, courts held that plaintiff can meet the
notice requirement only by serving process on that branch of the
defendant
government responsible for the transaction giving rise to his
0 3
claim.

3. Underlying Policies
The primary objective of a jurisdictional scheme should be to balance and reconcile plaintiffs interest in easy and certain access to the
courts with defendant's interests in receiving notice, not being sued in
too distant a forum, and having a meaningful opportunity to defend.
The conflict between these interests has been amplified in litigation
against foreign states because, historically, plaintiffs have had very
difficult access to courts and defendants had a specially protected
interest in not being forced to litigate. The secondary objective of the
rules of jurisdiction should be to temper the exercise of jurisdiction
sufficiently to avoid frustrating the policies inherent in sovereign immunity. Those policy objectives of jurisdictional rules are independent
of the goals underlying the separate inquiry into sovereign immunity
issues.
The jurisdictional scheme suggested in Petrol Shipping was more
effective than in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction in accommodating
the conflicting interests of both plaintiff and the defendant government. Plaintiffs' heavy reliance on jurisdictional attachments-to establish in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction-resulted in freezing numerous scattered properties and assets of foreign countries, thus
causing significant irritation to their governments."0 4 In addition, the
necessity to locate property had several undesirable side-effects, including forum-shopping, races to the courthouse to secure attachment
orders, and indiscriminate attachments of properties only tenuously

161. Id.
162. See Carl, supra note 4, at 1013.
163. See Vicente v. Trinidad & Tobago, 53 A.D.2d 76, 77, 385 N.Y.S.2d 83, 85
(1976), aff'd, 42 N.Y.2d 929, 366 N.E.2d 1361, 397 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (1977). See
generally Miller, Service of Processon State, Local and Foreign Governments under
Rule 4, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-Some Unfinished Business for the
Rulemakers, 46 F.R.D. 101 (1968).
164. House Report, supra note 2, at 26-27, reprintedin 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 6625-26.
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connected to plaintiff's claim.16 5 Plaintiffs also attached property
allegedly owned by foreign states but held in the possession of third
parties not necessarily related to the defendant. 60 Moreover, plaintiff's recovery was generally limited to the value of the property
attached. 6 7 All of these factors made litigation unnecessarily complex and cumbersome, inconveniencing the principal litigants as well
as third parties, and frustrating the policies underlying sovereign
immunity.
Petrol Shipping made personal jurisdiction available, thus relieving
plaintiffs of the burden of locating and attaching property. The restrictions inherent in a nexus requirement were fair, and protected
defendant's interest in not litigating in completely unexpected forums.
Moreover, Petrol Shipping was largely effective in avoiding the irritation to foreign states caused by widespread attachments of their property. Finally, the Petrol Shipping court was willing to fashion an ad
hoc and probably effective rule for service of process. In summary,
Petrol Shipping largely accounted for the policies that any jurisdictional scheme should serve, while avoiding damage to the policies
inherent in sovereign immunity.
Petrol Shipping was never widely followed in the United States,
however, and thus did not receive the benefits of extensive judicial
refinement. A valid and sound method of service of process, therefore,
was still lacking. 68 Until enactment of the FSIA, the dominant
method of acquiring jurisdiction was property attachments. The FSIA
completely revamped this system in 1977 by prohibiting all seizures of
property for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction. 69 The statute
adopts the approach of Petrol Shipping, but reflects an effort to refine
and improve the basic features of that case.
D. Enforcement of Judgments
1. The Courts' Practice
One final problem with the law of sovereign immunity as it existed
prior to 1977 was its approach to the enforcement of judgments.
165. See Lowenfeld I, supra note 3, at 386-89; Pugh & McLaughlin, supra note 3,
at 43-50; infra notes 233, 393 and accompanying text. See generallyDelson, Applicability of Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity to Actions to Perfect Attachment,
1961 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 121 (analysis of law regarding attachments prior to
1976).
166. See Aerotrade, Inc. v. Haiti, 376 F. Supp. 1281 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Lowenfeld
I, supra note 3, at 386-87; see also National Am. Corp. v. Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622,
632-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (series of complicated attachments), aff'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d
Cir. 1979).
167. National Am. Corp. v. Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
aff'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979).
168. Miller, supra note 163, at 121-38.
169. 28 U.S.C. § 1609 (1976).
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Judgments against foreign states have generally been unenforceable
due to their absolute immunity from execution proceedings. This
principle was established in Dexter & Carpenter, Inc. v. Kunglig
Jarnvagsstyrelsen.170 Plaintiff had obtained a judgment against the
Swedish national railroad, which the court considered part of the
Swedish government. When plaintiff sought to enforce the judgment
by executing upon property of Sweden located in the United States,
Sweden claimed sovereign immunity. The court held that Sweden was
entitled to absolute immunity from seizure of any of its property in the
United States, including commercial property. 17 Although the court
deplored the injustice of not enforcing a valid judgment, it believed
that absolute immunity from execution was the rule throughout the
world, including countries that had adopted the restrictive doctrine
for other purposes. The court reasoned that seizure of property is an
act so offensive to a state's dignity that no exceptions to immunity can
be admitted.
Dexter & Carpenterbecame the rule in the United States. Although
the Tate Letter adopted the restrictive doctrine of immunity in 1952,
172
that change of policy had no impact on execution proceedings.
Judicial reluctance to restrict immunity from seizures of property was
due largely to State Department policy. The Department adhered to a
rule of absolute immunity from such seizures, even though it often
rendered illusory the restrictive doctrine announced in the Tate Let73

ter. 1

Scholars have been divided on the issue of absolute immunity from
execution. One commentator who favors the restrictive doctrine for
immunity from suit nevertheless recommends an absolute rule for
execution purposes.174 He argues that a seizure of property constitutes an extremely serious affront to a nation's dignity and should be
avoided at all costs. Instead, plaintiffs should seek to satisfy judgments
against foreign states by presenting them through diplomatic channels. Another scholar, however, argues that foreign states will take
advantage of execution immunity by routinely failing to satisfy judgments. 175 Therefore, he advocates adoption of a restrictive doctrine
for execution purposes.
170. 43 F.2d 705 (21 Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 896 (1931).

171. Id. at 708, 710.
172. Lowenfeld II, supra note 3, at 926-27; see Comment, Sovereign Immunity
vs. Execution of Judgment: A Need to Reappraise Our National Policy, 13 B.C.
Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 369, 374-82 (1971).
173. See Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka Nat'l Corp., 15 A.D.2d 111, 116, 222
N.Y.S.2d 128, 133 (1961), aff'd per curiam, 12 N.Y.2d 781, 186 N.E.2d 676, 235
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1962). In this case the court, commenting on State Department policy,
noted that a foreign state's property could be attached for jurisdictional purposes but
could not be used subsequently for execution purposes.
174. Lowenfeld II, supra note 3, at 927-29.
175. See Smit I, supra note 159, at 67-68.
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Most modern decisions accepted absolute immunity from execution

without extended analysis.17 6 A few cases sidestepped the rule, but
failed to articulate their reasons clearly and never mounted a principled attack upon immunity from execution. Instead, they invoked
subtle and sometimes unpersuasive distinctions to conclude that the
general rule of immunity was inapplicable.
In Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba, S.A. v. Motor Vessel Ciudad
de la Habana,177 the Fourth Circuit held that the government of Cuba
had implicitly waived immunity from suit by filing answers to plaintiff's complaint without reserving the immunity defense. After its
analysis of implied waiver, the court turned to the question of
whether plaintiff could execute upon the attached vessel. 7 8
The court concluded that as a general rule a vaiver of immunity
from suit, whether explicit or implicit, does not automatically entail a
waiver of immunity from execution. In this case, however, Cuba's
implicit waiver was found to extend to execution because its property
had already been seized when it entered its first appearance in the
case. In view of the already completed property seizure, the failure to
object could be construed as a waiver of immunity from property
seizure. Although that seizure had been effected for jurisdictional
purposes rather than execution purposes, the court reasoned that immunity from property seizure draws no distinction between jurisdiction and execution. Accordingly, any waiver of that immunity would
extend to both jurisdictional and executional seizures of property.
Thus, Cuba's failure to object to property seizure at an early stage of
the litigation was held to constitute a waiver of immunity from execu79

tion.1

The court's convoluted reasoning ignores that the State Department

and other courts recognized the very distinction it refused to draw
between immunity from execution and immunity from jurisdictional
attachment.8 0 That distinction is obvious in that attachment is a
provisional remedy, whereas execution amounts to an irrevocable
deprivation of a foreign state's property. The State Department, however, had never formulated any precise policy on waivers of immunity
from execution, nor issued a suggestion of immunity in this case.
176. Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 21 Misc. 2d 1086, 192 N.Y.S.2d 469
(Sup. Ct. 1959); see Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614, 617-19 (5th Cir. 1974); Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198, 1200-01 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971); The American Law of Sovereign hnImunity, supra note
94.
177. 335 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1964), petition for prohibition or mandamus denied,
380 U.S. 970 (1965).
178. Id. at 631.
179. Id. at 627.
180. See Sovereign Immunity, supra note 4, at 446-47; supra notes 148-50 and
accompanying text.
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Thus, the court could reach its own decision and avoid the traditional
rule barring enforcement of a valid judgment against a foreign state.
Harris & Company Advertising v. Cuba""' also avoided the traditional rule. In that case, an intermediate Florida court found for the
plaintiff in a quasi in rem contract action based on various attachments of property. Because the transaction at issue was nongovernmental, the
court denied defendant's claim of sovereign immunity
82
from suit.

The court then addressed the issue of permitting execution upon the
attached property to satisfy plaintiff's judgment. The opinion made
no attempt to distinguish the facts from those in Dexter & Carpenter.
Instead, it reasoned very simply that the attached property was not
immune from execution because it was not shown to be related to a
governmental activity. In effect, the court casually and sub silentio
adopted the restrictive doctrine for purposes of executing upon a
foreign state's property. Moreover, Harris & Company required a
defendant state to show "by a preponderance of the evidence" that
property is governmental in order to establish immunity from execution. 8 3 The court thus reached a surprisingly modern result, al-

though it can be criticized for oversimplifying the operative policies.
S. T. Tringali Co. v. The Tug Pemex XV 184 is another case that
avoided the rule of Dexter & Carpenterby sleight-of-hand reasoning.
Plaintiff brought an action for damages arising from a collision of
ocean vessels, and attached a boat owned by a corporation that was in
turn wholly-owned by the Mexican government. Defendant's motion
to dismiss because of sovereign immunity did not prevail because the
activities at issue were commercial. After plaintiff won on the merits,
the court decided that the judgment could be satisfied by executing
upon the attached vessel. The judge denied immunity from execution
because the vessel was owned by a government instrumentality engaged in private commerce rather than by the Mexican government
itself. 185
The reasoning of S. T. Tringali confused the issue of the vessel's
ownership with that of its function. The court refused to hold outright
that the immunity was unavailable for a commercial government
vessel, a holding which would have contradicted Dexter & Carpenter.
Instead, the court emphasized the fact of ownership by an instrumentality engaged in commerce and held such ownership to be a sufficient
181. 127 So.2d 687 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961); see United States v. Harris & Co.
Advertising, 149 So.2d 384 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); see also Note, The Castro
Government in American Courts: Sovereign Immunity and the Act of State Doctrine,
75 Harv. L. Rev. 1607, 1612-13 (1962) (approving of result in Harris).
182. 127 So.2d at 692.
183. Id. at 693.
184. 274 F. Supp. 227 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
185. Id. at 230.
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basis for denying immunity from execution.'"I That holding suggests
that such an instrumentality is to be treated differently from the
government for purposes of execution. Earlier in the same opinion,
however, the court declared that the defendant corporation would be
treated as equivalent to and part of the Mexican government for
purposes of immunity from the suit.' 7 The case thus suggests that
wholly-owned instrumentalities should receive the same treatment as
states for purposes of immunity from suit, but should receive less
favorable treatment for purposes of immunity from execution. The
FSIA adopts that approach,' 8 8 and the position may be defensible, but
the court neither explained nor justified it.
2. Underlying Policies
Prior to enactment of the FSIA, the absolute rule of Dexter &
Carpenterprevailed in the United States. The above-described cases,
however, illustrate that courts occasionally circumvented that rule
and permitted execution upon commercial property. In effect, those
cases follow a restrictive doctrine of immunity from execution, thus
suggesting a comparison and reexamination of the policies underlying
the two rules.
The policy that has most often been advanced as justifying the
absolute rule is the avoidance of insult to the dignity and honor of a
foreign nation and consequent embarrassment to American foreign
policy. After the United States adopted the restrictive doctrine for
immunity from suit, the seriousness of property seizure was thought to
justify continued adherence to absolute immunity from execution.' s9
The governmental interest in protecting national dignity is still
operative today, but its persuasive force has weakened for several
reasons. First, the dignity of states is a less meaningful concept today
than it was at a time when governments w.,ere frequently synonomous
with royalty and interacted largely through personal relations among
aristocrats. Today, international relations are handled by complex
and impersonal bureaucracies whose effectiveness does not depend on
the inviolability of their national dignity and honor.' 0 0
Second, governments are engaged increasingly in trade and commerce with private persons. The international roles of states in the
186. Id.
187. id.
188. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(2), 1610(a)(2),(a)(5),(b).
189. See Lowenfeld II, supra note 3, at 927-29. Other countries, however, are
increasingly adopting restrictive rules of immunity from execution. See Garcia-Mora,
supra note 3, at 354-59; Comment, Sovereign Inmunity of States Engaged in Colnmercial Activities, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1086, 1090-91, 1094-95 (1965).
190. See Lauterpacht, supra note 3, at 230-31: Comment, Sovereign Immunity
from ludicial Enforcement: The Impact of the European Convention on State hnmunity, 12 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 130 (1973).
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past were confined to the diplomatic, political and military areas,
whereas today governments discharge a vast range of functions that
bring them into close contact with foreign nationals. The frequency
and depth of interaction results in familiarity and, to a lesser degree,
equality between states and individuals. Governmental activities have
thus acquired a flavor of ordinary business dealings that give little
weight to the dignity and inviolability of states.
While the governmental interest in protecting national dignity has
weakened, other interests have emerged that require strong protection
against property seizure. The complexity of international economics
and the rising level of coordination among nations result in ever
higher degrees of interdependence. Moreover, the great volume of
international commerce means that at any point in time a state is
likely to have substantial assets located throughout the world. The
combination of these factors makes any substantial seizure of foreign
state property, commercial or otherwise, a potentially serious problem with economic and political repercussions that go beyond the
monetary value of the property seized. By comparison, merely requiring a foreign state to defend itself in court is a more easily accepted
interference in governmental functions. The concern with property
seizure is especially acute for developing countries, whose foreign
assets are likely to be more thinly spread and more sensitive to disruption.
The foregoing comments suggest that the governmental interest in
immunity from execution has changed but is still fairly compelling.
Nevertheless, it does not follow that absolute immunity is the proper
rule. Before fashioning a rule for granting immunity from execution,
the private interest in enforcing judgments should be evaluated and
weighed against the governmental interest.
The interest in enforcing a valid judgment is, almost by definition,
always substantial. In the absence of an enforcement mechanism, the
judicial machinery for adjudicating rights among litigants loses much
of its credibility. Thus, any legal system has a paramount interest in
keeping intact its methods of enforcing court orders and judgments.
Moreover, the successful plaintiff has a self-evident and compelling
interest in having his judgment executed.
Notwithstanding these powerful factors, the private interest was in
the past completely dismissed by the absolute rule, in favor of the
interests of foreign states. A change has occurred, however, that today
may suggest a more balanced weighing of interests. Previously, dealings between states and private individuals were sufficiently insubstantial that the aggregate private interest in enforcing judgments
could be deemed vastly less important than the offense to governmental dignity caused by the seizure of state property. Today, however, the sheer volume of trade between states and persons has significantly amplified the aggregate private interest. Simultaneously, the
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focus of the governmental interest has shifted from the preservation of
dignity to the maintenance of smooth economic and other governmental functions. Thus, the previous disproportion between the governmental interest and the aggregate private interest has given way to a
more equally weighted balance of interests. Furthermore, private and
governmental entities now have a mutual substantial interest in establishing a stable international economic and political climate.
An absolute rule of immunity, therefore, is inappropriate because
of its total disregard of the private interest and negative effect on the
stability of the international legal order. The absolute doctrine reflects
an undifferentiating a priori determination that a foreign state's interest will prevail over the private interest regardless of the circumstances. That determination appears crude and blatantly unjust. Its
only advantage is predictability and ease of application. The three
cases discussed above demonstrate that judges will sacrifice those
benefits in order to account more accurately for the competing interests. None of those cases, however, fashions the finely tuned restrictive
rule or achieves the delicate balancing of interests that is required in
this area of highly polarized, conflicting concerns. The Dexter &
Carpenter rule was thus properly replaced by a restrictive doctrine
when Congress enacted the FSIA.
III. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES Ac-r OF 1976
The FSIA went into effect on January 19, 1977. 'll Since that date,
the immunities of foreign sovereigns from legal action have been
governed by the statutory provisions. The Act achieves four basic
aims. First, it conclusively establishes the restrictive doctrine of immunity in United States law. 9 2 Prior to passage of the statute, that
doctrine had been followed only erratically and was vulnerable to
political pressures transmitted through the State Department.
Second, the FSIA terminates the dominant role of the State Department in the area of sovereign immunity. 9 3 It restores to the courts
the responsibility for determining questions of sovereign immunity as
a matter of legal principle, rather than foreign policy. At the same
time, the FSIA is intended to cure9 the
due process problems that
4
afflicted State Department practice.'

191. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); see House Report, supra note 2, re-

printed in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6604. For good articles on legal
practice under the Act, see Carl, supra note 4; Kahale & Vega, supra note 4.

192. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602, 1603, 1605-07 (1976); House Report, supra note 2, at
14, 18-23, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6613, 6616-22.
193. See 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976).
194. House Report, supra note 2, at 7-8, 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &

Ad. News at 6605-06, 6610-11.
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Third, the Act establishes firm jurisdictional rules governing the
commencement of legal action against foreign states. 0 5 The statute
provides for federal subject matter jurisdiction over actions against
97
foreign states,' 98 establishes personal jurisdiction over foreign states,1
and creates several exclusive methods of serving process on foreign
states and their instrumentalities.' 98 Significantly, the FSIA eliminates in rem and quasi in rem actions against foreign states by prohibiting attachments of foreign states' property for jurisdictional purposes
and limiting subject matter jurisdiction to in personam actions. 0 9
Fourth, the statute permits execution upon the property of foreign
states in certain instances, thereby enabling plaintiffs to enforce judgments. 200 Thus, the FSIA fashions a restrictive doctrine that permits
execution only upon commercial property and only if the property to
be seized relates to the claim that is the basis of the judgment, or when
certain other conditions are met.20 ' Judgments against an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state, however, can be executed against
any of the instrumentality's property in the United States, as long202
as
the entity is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States.
In addition to those four major changes, the FSIA effects a number
of related modifications. For example, prejudgment attachments of
property are prohibited for both jurisdictional and security purposes,
but are exceptionally permitted for the latter purpose if the state has
explicitly waived its immunity from prejudgment attachments. 20 3 The
bar against prejudgment attachments extends to maritime liens
against vessels,204 thus eliminating an important in rem procedure
that has no satisfactory in personam equivalent. In order to correct
that defect, the Act declares by simple fiat that henceforth maritime
liens against foreign states' vessels shall be treated as in personam
actions and can be commenced by following certain procedures.20,
Finally, after entry of judgment, plaintiff can secure an attachment or

195. Id. at 8, 12-14, 23-26, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
6606, 6610-12, 6622-25.
196. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976).
197. Id. § 1330(b).
198. Id. § 1608.
199. Id. § 1610.
200. Id. § 1610(a); House Report, supra note 2, at 7-8, 26-31, reprinted in 1976
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6605-06, 6624-30.
201. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1)-(5) (1976). The other circumstances include waiver,
property expropriated in violation of international law, property that is immovable
or acquired by succession or gift, and liability insurance. Id. § 1610(a)(I)-(5).
202. Id. § 1610(b)(2).
203. Id. §§ 1609, 1610; House Report, supra note 2, at 26-27, 30, reprinted in
1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6625-26, 6629.
204. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(b) (1976); see House Report, supra note 2, at 21-22,
reprintedin 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6620-21.
205. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(b) (1976).
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execution order by satisfying a notice requirement and demonstrating
that the defendant
state is likely to remove its assets from the court's
20 6
jurisdiction.

The FSIA also establishes criteria to determine when an entity will
be deemed to be an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.207
The status of an entity is important: First, it determines whether
treatment under the statute is required; second, it determines whether
the special20 provisions
governing agencies and instrumentalities are
8
applicable.

The Act has special provisions governing disputes over property that
has been expropriated in violation of international law.20 9 Foreign
states do not enjoy immunity from legal action concerning such property or property exchanged for it. Additionally, execution is permissable in cases involving expropriation.2-10
Other areas covered by the FSIA include removal of actions from
state to federal court,21 ' venue,2 12 the right to jury trial,213 substantive
tort law in regard to foreign states,214 counterclaims, - Is and property
acquired by foreign states through succession or gift.21
A. Elimination of State Department Dominance
1. The Statutory Solution
The FSIA has largely succeeded in eliminating the State Department's role in determinations of sovereign immunity. Section 1602 of
the FSIA describes its purposes and states, that "[c]laims of foreign
states to immunity should henceforth be decided by courts of the
206. Id. § 1610(c).
207. Id. § 1603(b); see House Report, supra note 2, at 15-16, reprinted in 1976
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6613-14.
208. See Carl, supra note 4, at 1028-31. The special provisions determine different
methods of service of process for agencies and instrumentalities than for governments, and provide for punitive damages against the former but not the latter. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1606, 1608(b) (1976).
209. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(3), 1610(a)(3) (1976); House Report, supra note 2, at
19-20, 28, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6618, 6627.
210. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(3) (1976).
211. Id. § 1441(d); House Report, supra note 2, at 32-33, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6631-32.
212. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f) (1976); House Report, supra note 2, at 31-32, reprinted
in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6630-31.
213. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976); House Report, supra note 2, at 13, reprinted in
1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6611-12.
214. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5), 1606 (1976); House Report, supra note 2, at 20-23,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6619-22.
215. 28 U.S.C. § 1607 (1976); House Report, supra note 2, at 23, reprintedin 1976
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6622.
216. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(4), 1610(a)(4)(A) (1976); House Report, supra note 2,
at 20, 29, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6618-19, 6628.
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United States . . in conformity with the principles set forth in this
chapter."2 1 7 The legislative history explains that a principal purpose
of the Act is "to transfer the determination of sovereign immunity
from the executive branch to the judicial branch, thereby reducing
the foreign policy implications of immunity determinations and assuring litigants that these often crucial decisions are made on21 purely
legal
8
grounds and under procedures that insure due process.1
After the statute's effective date, courts began to develop a coherent
body of case law, thus correcting one of the principal defects of
previous practice. Although cases have been decided inconsistently in
a few areas, 21 9 courts are sensitive to the need for uniformity and
predictability in interpreting the FSIA. 22 0 Determinations of immunity are now being made according to legal standards rather than in
response to political pressures and foreign policy. The statute has thus
eliminated the basic schizophrenia in the American approach to sovereign immunity. This approach previously wavered uneasily between
political expediency and legal principle, 2and
all too often disguised the
2
former with the vocabulary of the law. 1
The statutory provisions, of course, also constitute policy choices.
They reflect judgments that seek to strike a fixed balance between the
interests of private persons and foreign states, attempting to reach a
fair accommodation. The Act's underlying policies thus minimize
considerations based on short term foreign policy. In effect, the Act
reflects a policy judgment that the benefits formerly gained by assigning a prominent role to the State Department did not outweigh the
negative side effects, such as uncertainty in litigation, disregard for
international law, and frequent injustice to private persons.22 2
2. New Problems
The FSIA succeeds in recasting the American concept of sovereign
immunity in a uniform theoretical framework that is based on law
and tailored to the international perception of the principle. The
abruptness and magnitude of this change, however, raises the possibility that the pendulum has swung too far in the direction of the
judiciary. Its exclusive control may result in the mishandling of cases
217. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976).
218. House Report, supra note 2, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 6606.
219. The best surveys of recent cases under the Act are Carl, supra note 4, at
1014-54, and Kahale & Vega, supra note 4, at 226-58.
220. See the extensive discussion of the Act's background in Jet Line Servs. v. M/V
Marsa El Hariga, 462 F. Supp. 1165, 1168-71 (D. Md. 1978). The court said that its
decision must be made "without reference to political considerations." Id. at 1172.
221. See supra notes 87-101 and accompanying text.
222. House Report, supra note 2, at 7-9, 14, reprintedin 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 6605-08, 6612-13.
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that require some input from the executive branch. Because sovereign
immunity inescapably has some aspects related to foreign affairs, the
attempt to isolate it completely from executive influence distorts reality and may lead to unsound results.
The Act's excessively harsh excision of executive influence is evidenced by three distinct, but related, situations. The State Department is no longer able to intervene (i) to prevent frivolous lawsuits
against foreign governments, (ii) in large transnational cases which
might be best resolved diplomatically or, (iii) in cases where national
security might warrant executive input.
Foreign states are now required to respond to every legal proceeding through judicial channels, irrespective of the frivolousness of
plaintiff's claim. In Aquino Robles v. Mexicana de Aviacion,2 2 plaintiffs brought an action for false imprisonment by the Mexican government. It was clear from the plaintiffs' pleadings that the court did not
have jurisdiction over the case.22 4 Prior to enactment of the FSIA, the
Mexican government could have relied on diplomatic channels to
request a suggestion of immunity from the State Department. Under
the statute, however, the State Department lacks that authority.
Thus, Mexico was forced to respond through legal procedures, at
potentially great expense and inconvenience..2 25 Mexico ultimately
was able to have the case dismissed, by having a Mexican lawyer in its
2
foreign ministry file a special motion to dismiss. 21
Other governments faced with similarly frivolous legal action, however, may not have the resources to prepare their own defense or may
not be fortunate enough to deal with a sympathetic judge. Thus, they
could be forced to retain American counsel, when a brief and inexpensive inquiry by the State Department might have revealed the insubstantiality of plaintiff's case and resulted in a quick dismissal. The
FSIA prevents that solution and thus imposes an unnecessary and
potentially heavy burden on foreign states.
The FSIA also creates difficulties in cases arising from large-scale
problems with transnational implications. One example of such a
problem is the 1979 blowout of a Mexican oil well in the Gulf of
Mexico, pouring out more than 100 million gallons of oil that formed
a giant slick in Texas coastal waters. The economic and environmental damage caused by the disaster resulted in numerous lawsuits
amounting to more than 355 million dollars..2 2 7 Other possible disasters with transnational implications come to mind readily, including,
223. No. 77-50 (Tribunal Superior de Puerto Rico, Sala de San Juan, filed July 20,
1977); see Carl, supra note 4, at 1056-58.
224. See Carl, supra note 4, at 1056.

225. See id.

226. Id. at 1056-57.
227. Id at 1010, 1063; see Note, Ixtoc I: Internationaland Domestic Remedies for
Transboundary Pollution Injury, 49 Fordham L. Rev. 404 (1980).
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for example, nuclear accidents, dumping of toxic substances, genetic
engineering accidents, and chemical pollution. Moreover, disasters of
this type are increasingly likely to occur in the future as technology
and science become more advanced and create greater hazards more
frequently.
Disputes like those arising from the oil well blowout may be more
effectively and inexpensively resolved through diplomatic negotiations
between the governments affected, than -through litigation. The
United States might negotiate for a lump sum settlement with Mexico,
creating a fund from which to satisfy private claimants. Alternatively,
the State Department might cooperate in establishing an impartial
forum to adjudicate the dispute or might take the matter to the World
Court. Although the FSIA does not prohibit resort to these alternatives, it raises the specter of numerous lawsuits proceeding on independent theories alongside action by the executive branch. The FSIA
provides no effective means of coordinating individual and national
action. The statute thus impedes the development of comprehensive
solutions and joint national action in response to major transnational
disasters.
Finally, the FSIA does not permit executive intervention in judicial
proceedings even when it might be required by national security or in
emergency situations. When Iran seized American hostages, for example, a national security problem developed that necessitated strong
executive action. At least three aspects of the President's responsive
strategy had substantial implications for litigation against Iran, yet
could not be made to fit into the FSIA scheme. 228 First, the executive

branch generally discouraged the institution of legal proceedings
against Iran and sought numerous stays in pending actions.22,

The

logic underlying this effort was that private legal action might offend
the Iranian government and hinder sensitive negotiations for the re-

lease of the hostages.2 30 Second, the President froze all Iranian assets

in the United States, hoping to use them as a bargaining chip in
negotiations. 231 That order and its implementing regulations 232 be228. See McGreevey, The Iranian Crisis and U.S. Law, 2 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus.

384 (1980).
229. See National Airmotive v. Iran, 499 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1980); MeGreevey, supra note 228, at 416-19.
230. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1980, at A17, col. 1. In a case filed against Iran in
federal court, United States Attorney Kenneth Mighell filed a motion to stay the
action, stating that "[t]he United States is deeply concerned that proceedings on the
issues now pending before this court. . . will create a serious risk of prejudicing the
continuing efforts of the United States government to resolve the hostage crisis." Id.
at col. 1-2; see also Smit I, supra note 159.
231. 31 C.F.R. § 535.201-07 (1980). Authority for this order derives from the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, § 202, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-51 (1976),
as amended by 50 U.S.C. § 1706 (Supp. 11 1978 & Supp. III 1979).
232. Iranian Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 535 (1980).
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came the subject of extensive litigation regarding their effect on prejudgment attachments, which the FSIA generally prohibits.23 Third,
the accords finally reached with Iran provided for the suspension of
all claims pending in court against Iran and their resolution through
an international claims commission.2 34 The litigation that ensued
generally challenged the President's power to suspend private claims,
but also specifically questioned whether such action conflicts with the
FSIA's purpose
of eliminating the executive's role in litigation against
2 35
foreign states.

The courts' reaction to executive action in the Iranian crisis was
mixed. Many initially stayed proceedings at the request of the State
Department, but subsequently asserted their role under the FSIA and
denied extensions of such stays.2-36 One court read the freezing order
as suspending Iran's immunity, under the FSIA, from prejudgment
attachments.2 37 This dubious reading finds no support in the FSIA,
and was strongly criticized. Finally, the Supreme Court upheld the
President's power to suspend private claims and provided a superficial
and unsatisfactory analysis of the actions taken on the FSIA. s
The Iranian crisis suggests that in sensitive foreign policy situations
the executive cannot ultimately be foreclosed from attempting to
influence the courts or from taking independent action with implica233. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(d) (1976); see Comment, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: The Use of Pre-judgment Attachment to Ensure Satisfaction of Anticipated
Judgments, 2 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 517 (1980); infra note 393 and accompanying
text.
234. For a text of the Agreements between Iran and the United States, see IranUnited States: Settlement of the Hostage Crisis, 20 Int'l Legal Materials 2204 (1981).
See generally McLaughlin & Teclaff, The Iranian Hostage Agreements: A Legal
Analysis, 4 Fordham Int' I L. J. 223 (1981) (analysis of international and constitutional implications of Iranian Hostage Agreements); Note, Settlement of the Iranian
Hostage Crisis: An Exercise of Constitutionaland Statutory Executive Prerogativein
Foreign Affairs, 13 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 993 (1981) (same).
235. Electronic Data Sys. of Iran v. Social Sec. Org. of Iran, 508 F. Supp. 1350,
1360-63 (N.D. Tex. 1981); National Airmotive Corp. v. Iran, 499 F. Supp. 401, 405
(D.D.C. 1980).
236. E.g., National Airmotive Corp. v. Iran, 499 F. Supp. 401, 405 (D.D.C.
1980); E-Systems, Inc. v. Iran, 491 F. Supp. 1294, 1297 n.4 (N.D. Tex. 1980); see
McGreevey, supra note 228, at 417-19.
237. New Eng. Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission
Co., 502 F. Supp. 120, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). This case was a consolidation of 96 cases
on the issue of the availability of prejudgment attachment of blocked Iranian assets.
See Carl, supra note 4, at 1047-50; McGreevey, supra note 228, at 407-11; Smit I,
supra note 159, at 67-69.
238. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 101 S. Ct. 2972 (1981). The Court upheld the
President's action by reasoning that the FSIA was not intended to deprive the
executive of power in this area and that the suspension of claims did not deprive the
federal courts of jurisdiction in violation of article III of the Constitution, but rather
was a direction to the courts to apply a different rule of substantive law. The Court
derived the President's general power to effect the claims settlement from a long
history of congressional acquiescence in such executive action.
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tions for lawsuits against other countries.2 3 "' Frivolous lawsuits and
major environmental disasters are also situations in which cooperation
through official channels is likely to achieve sounder and more predictable results than independent, concurrent and potentially conflicting action.2 40 This reality should be statutorily recognized and regulated, by providing for coordination between the two branches and,
in some cases, for executive dominance.
3. Suggested Remedies
In constructing a role for the executive and establishing channels of
communication between it and the judiciary, the drafters must avoid
a recurrence of the executive dominance prevalent prior to enactment
of the FSIA. Accordingly, the FSIA should retain provisions that
ensure judicial dominance and should grant influence to the executive, other than through amicus curiae briefs, only in enumerated
circumstances. The statute should be sufficiently flexible to enable the
executive to respond to a variety of situations without unduly influencing cases that do not show a genuine need for non-legal solutions or
extra-judicial action.
The problems described above as requiring some form of executive
action suggest a possible two-tiered approach to amending the FSIA in
this area. The oil spill disaster illustrates a large-scale transnational
dispute that may be handled more efficiently through diplomatic
mediation than litigation. A court can readily recognize from the
circumstances of the case that judicial solutions would be less effective
than executive action. Therefore, the FSIA should give the courts the
option of calling on the executive when they determine that the
executive's resources are better suited to resolving the case than are
those of the judiciary.
The Aquino Robles case and the hostage crisis, by comparison,
would not permit a court to determine upon a prima facie examination of the facts that executive action is appropriate. In cases like
Aquino Robles, courts generally rely on the litigants to bring even

239. See supra note 230 and accompanying text. The State Department has already indicated its desire to communicate its views on the Act to the courts. Dep't
State Pub. Notice No. 507, 41 Fed. Reg. 50,883 (1976); Sovereign Immunity, supra
note 4, at 454-55.
240. See Smit I, supra note 159, at 62. Professor Smit believes that the courts
should remain dominant, but that in the event the executive is given power to accord
immunity, it should be required to deposit a sum or undertaking with the court to
protect the plaintiff. Smit also argues that the provisions shifting power to tile courts
should be more clear. Id. at 61 n.63. Professor Smit's proposal of posting a sum or
undertaking can be criticized on the basis that litigation against that sum, as he
suggests, will still lead to inquiry into the foreign state's affairs, the avoidance of
which was presumably the objective of granting immunity.
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glaring defects, such as lack of jurisdiction, to their attention. 24' In
addition, the courts are not able to determine frivolousness from the
facts of a case until litigation has proceeded at least to discovery.
Therefore, intervention by the executive at its own initiative, but at
the request of the foreign state defendant, would be necessary to
expose the frivolous nature of plaintiff's claim.
Similarly, in an international crisis a court is not likely to recognize
national security implications. The executive should again intervene
on its own initiative to bring those implications to the court's attention
and if appropriate, bring about a termination of legal action. The
FSIA might thus be amended to permit executive intervention when
required by national security or when legal action has been commenced frivolously and is likely to harass foreign states.
The general approach suggested ensures judicial dominance because it relies on the courts' initiative in the potentially broad range of
cases, the complexity and transnational nature of which makes executive action desirable. Only in the rare instances of clear frivolousness
or extreme crisis should intervention by the executive on its own
initiative be permitted. At the same time, flexibility can be achieved
by carefully defining and distinguishing the situations that are appropriate for intervention.
Excessive executive influence can be further avoided by limiting
executive power to terminate a suit to those cases in which certain
formal conditions have been met. For example, the statute might
require a determination by the President that a national emergency
exists before the executive can take action overriding the other provisions of the FSIA. In the case of frivolous legal action, the statute
might provide that the courts shall not be bound by executive determinations of frivolousness. Finally, it might be required that an, executive action conform to certain minimal standards of due process and
provide adequate compensation if the property rights of plaintiffs are
injured.
The FSIA at present expresses a policy of determining sovereign
immunity in accordance with a balancing of plaintiffs' interests and
foreign states' interests, without accounting for other factors.2 42 Nevertheless, the Act should also recognize that in some situations the
litigants' competing interests are collectively outweighed by considerations of national security or international emergencies. Weight must
also be given to the policy of promoting a stable international economic climate. Moreover, the statute should account for situations in
241. Carl, supra note 4, at 1057 (citing C. McCormick, Handbook of The Law of
Evidence § 335, at 776 (2d ed. 1972)).
242. See Jet Line Servs. v. M/V Marsa El Hariga, 462 F. Supp. 1165, 1172 (D.
Md. 1978); Edlow Int'l Co. v. Nuklearna Elektrarna Krsko, 441 F. Supp. 827, 832
(D.D.C. 1977).
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which the competing interests are best promoted and reconciled not
by judicial solutions, but by political and diplomatic mediation.
While the basic premise of the FSIA is sound and should be the norm,
the Act should also recognize exceptional situations that require departures from the norm.
B. The Restrictive Doctrine
1. The Statutory Scheme
The legislative history of the FSIA states that one of its principal
goals is the firm establishment of the restrictive doctrine of sovereign
immunity in American legal practice.2 43 The statutory means for
implementing that goal is to establish a general rule of immunity
subject to express exceptions. 244 The exceptions include actions based
on waiver of immunity, commercial activities or transactions, property taken or expropriated in violation of international law, property
acquired by succession or gift, immovable property, and certain
torts. 45 In addition, the FSIA allows counterclaims arising out of the
same transaction upon which a foreign state as plaintiff has instituted
whether or not related to the action
an action, as well as any setoff,
246
instituted by a foreign state.
The statutory version of the restrictive doctrine can be characterized as an attempt to implement the policy of giving plaintiffs legal
recourse against foreign states, but only when litigation does not
threaten governmental functions about which foreign states are likely
to be sensitive.2 47 The general rule of immunity amounts to a presumption that all activities of foreign states should be shielded from
litigation because governmental interests outweigh private interests.
The exceptions, however, represent a series of situations in which that
presumption is defeated because the private interest in adjudicating
claims outweighs the governmental interest in shielding its functions
from foreign judicial scrutiny.
The commercial activity exception, for example, reflects a policy
judgment that in business dealings the private party ordinarily has an
expectation of judicial resolution of its claims, while sensitive govern-

243. House Report, supra note 2, at 7, 14, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 6605, 6613.
244. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-1605 (1976).
245. Id. § 1605(a)(1)-(5).
246. Id. § 1607.
247. The House Report states that the Act adopts the restrictive doctrine in order
to give greater protection to private plaintiffs. House Report, supra note 2, at 7-9
reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6605-08. For a comparison of
commercial activities as set forth in the Act and as defined in Victory Transp. Inc. v.
Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965), see von Mehren, supra note 4, at 53.
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mental activities are not likely to be implicated. 2 8

Moreover, inter-

national trade is promoted by denying immunity from commercial

claims. 249 Accordingly, the FSIA codifies a judgment that in the

business context the private interest is more significant than the governmental interest.

The other exceptions to immunity provided in the FSIA can also be

0
viewed as the result of a delicate balancing of competing interests. 2

Private persons have an interest in having their rights determined
according to law, while foreign states need to shield essential public

functions from potentially crippling litigation. The only extraneous
policy that should influence that balancing of competing interests is
the goal of fostering a stable international economic climate.
The generalizations implicit in the statutory definitions are basi-

cally sound. 25

For example, it is sound policy to favor private over

governmental interests in an ordinary commercial situation.

2

The

statute, however, makes that generalization applicable in all commercial contexts without admitting the possibility that its underlying
premise could be incorrect in some cases. The premise that private
interests are of greater significance than governmental interests would
be incorrect in a business transaction vitally affecting an essential
public function. In a case arising from such a transaction, immunity
might be appropriate notvithstanding that the activity at issue is

commercial. The FSIA, however, would not permit that result.
The problem hypothesized above stems from several factors. The

Act's heavy reliance on categorizations leads to rigidity and inflexibility in dealing with cases that frequently depend on subtle distinctions
and sensitive policy judgments. Moreover, the generality and imprecision of the statutory definitions does not encourage extensive analysis
of their constituent elements. For example, the definition of "commercial activity or transaction" is so broad and vague that it gives courts

248. Compare Gittler v. German Info. Ctr., 95 Misc.2d 788, 408 N.Y.S.2d 600
(Sup. Ct. 1978) (filming and related activity held noncommercial) with United
Euram Corp. v. U.S.S.R., 461 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (cultural project
contracts for performing artists held commercial).
249. See Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 703-04 (1976).
250. For example, the waiver exception can be analyzed in terms of a balancing of
interests. A waiver ordinarily occurs in a commercial context, such as the procurement of goods, in which the private interest is substantial and the governmental
function is non-vital. The existence of a waiver implies that the defendant government has made its own determination that essential or sensitive functions would not
be implicated if litigation occurred. This judgment by a foreign state makes it
reasonable to conclude that its interest in immunity is not overwhelming and is
therefore outweighed by the plaintiff's countervailing interest. 28 U.S.C. §
1605(a)(1) (1976); see House Report, supra note 2, at 18-19, reprintedin 1976 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6616-17.
251. See Kahale & Vega, supra note 4, at 243.
252. Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 70-04 (1976).
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little guidance in evaluating the factors that might2 lead
one to include
3
or exclude a particular act within the definition.
Short of revamping the Act's network of definitions, Congress
should add a form of saving clause to the Act that would allow courts
to extend immunity after making certain determinations, notwithstanding the applicability of an exception. Such determinations might
include considerations of whether statutory policy would be defeated
by a denial of immunity or whether vital interests of the defendant
state are at stake. The standard to be met by judges in applying the
saving clause should be sufficiently specific to prevent ad hoc grants of
immunity. Properly drafted, such a saving clause would give courts an
alternative when facing unusual facts that can be made to fit the
statutory scheme only through strained reasoning or distortion.
As long as the FSIA lacks a saving clause, its rigidity and generality
will lead to occasional subversion of its underlying policies.2 5 4 More

importantly, however, those defects will have the indirect and more
insidious effect of strained or poorly reasoned opinions. A series of
retard the development of sound
such opinions could substantially
255
case law under the FSIA.
2. The OPEC Case
The foregoing criticisms can be illustrated by analyzing a recent
case decided by a federal district court in California. In International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC,250 the
court granted immunity to OPEC and its member states in an antitrust action based on price-fixing in violation of the Sherman Act and

253. "A 'commercial activity' means either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976); see
Carl, supra note 4, at 1031-35.
254. A saving clause would resolve this problem by allowing the court to make a
determination of immunity, notwithstanding the commercial context of the transaction, if an essential public function is implicated. In essence, that judgment would be
based on the greater significance of the governmental interest as compared to the
private interest. A denial of immunity under the ordinary commercial activity exception would defeat the statutory policy of balancing the competing interests and
protecting the one found more important. The saving clause, however, would extend
immunity on that policy basis.
255. See Kahale & Vega, supra note 4, commenting on the "intended generality of
certain important provisions . . . and the unintended ambiguity of others." Id. at
258.
256. 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981); see
generally Note, Restrictive Immunity and the OPEC Cartel: A CriticalExamination
of the ForeignSovereign Immunities Act and International lAssociation of Machinists
v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 771 (1980);
Note, IAM v. OPEC: The Demise of the Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity
and of the ExtraterritorialEffect of the Sherman Act against Foreign Sovereigns, 41
U. Pitt. L. Rev. 841 (1980).
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seeking injunctive and compensatory relief. The court recognized that

the existence of subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA depended
upon whether the defendants were entitled to sovereign immunity.
The latter question in turn hinged on whether the activities
giving rise
2
to the action were commercial or noncommercial. 57,

The court's first task was to describe the OPEC members' activities.
These included acts such as agreeing on the oil pricing mechanism and
the government share of the profits, and imposing production controls, taxation, and direct price quotation. The court correctly recognized that a crucial element in characterizing an activity as commer-

cial or noncommercial is the breadth and comprehensiveness of its
description.25 8 The court also properly reasoned that a description of

the activity at issue should be guided by the legislative intent of the
FSIA. The court failed, however, to analyze this intent in terms of the

policies underlying the statute, and to describe OPEC's activity in
terms of those policies. Instead, Judge Hauk summarily concluded

that a narrow description was appropriate,
primarily because "a court
25
must base its ruling on specific facts."

Although the court purported to describe OPEC's acts narrowly,
the resulting formulation is loose and general. The opinion summa-

rizes the various components of OPEC's activity as "the establishment
by a sovereign state of the terms and conditions for the removal of a
-O
prime natural resource-to wit, crude oil-from its territory." 2c
The court's second task was to characterize the activity as commer-

cial or public within the meaning of the FSIA. Accordingly, Judge
Hauk first looked to the statute and its legislative history. - 1

He

257. Id. at 566.
258. Id. at 567. For example, the postal service could be described as selling
courier services (commercial) or as providing an essential public service (governmental). Similarly opposite but correct descriptions can be fashioned for other quasi-public functions that can be equally well performed by private entities. Examples include
mass transit, public utilities, public hospitals, certain types of insurance (such as crop
insurance), and certain housing projects. See Vicente v. Trinidad & Tobago, 53
A.D.2d 76, 77, 385 N.Y.S.2d 83, 85 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (questioning whether ownership
and management of a hospital by the state would be a private or public activity),
aff'd, 42 N.Y.2d 929, 366 N.E.2d 1361, 397 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (1977); see also Timberg
II, supra note 87, at 13-16. Four years before the OPEC case was decided, Timberg
posed the question: "Is there any logic or praticality in allocating wheat sales to the
legally responsible commercial sector, while assigning oil production and supply to
the immunized governmental sector of the economy?" Id. at 15 (footnote omitted).
The answer, not suggested by Timberg, may lie in the substantiality of the governmental interest in oil production, as compared to wheat procurement.
259. 477 F. Supp. at 567.
260. Id. Plaintiff sued OPEC as well as the member countries individually and
jointly. The court treated OPEC as an international organization which could not
legally be served with process. Thus, the court treated the lawsuit as one against the
member countries. Id. at 560.
261. Id. at 566-67.
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found, however, that the standards provided there were "somewhat
26 2
nebulous ... in the context of a particular factual situation.
Accordingly, he looked further to "the standards recognized under

international law." 2 63 In that area, the court derived guidance from

several United Nations documents recognizing the "sovereign right of
every State to dispose of its wealth and its natural resources."2 04
Finally, Judge Hauk described various forms of government regulation in the United States that controlled the production and marketing
2 05
of natural resources and were considered acts of government.
The principles derived from those sources establish and circumscribe (i) the right of a state over its natural resources, (ii) the right of
a state to further its national development and the well-being of its
people, and (iii) the right of the United States government to control
the development of its natural resources.2 6 6 Judge Hauk summarized

his discussion as demonstrating the complete sovereignty of each nation over its physical attributes, the importance of natural resource
development to the welfare of a national people, and the dependence
of such development on the command of the sovereign.2 0 7 On that

basis, he concluded that a state's "establishing the terms and conditions for removal of natural
resources from its territory .. . is a
2 6
governmental activity.

The OPEC court's initial task of describing OPEC's activity was
rendered difficult by the absence of statutory guidance on how to
isolate the acts that shall count for purposes of the FSIA.20 9

The

apparent statutory assumption is that such guidance is unnecessary
because the operative activities are easily recognized and described
and are then readily susceptible to characterization as "commercial"
or "public." The OPEC case illustrates, however, that the two-step
process of description and characterization is not automatic and its
result not self-evident. The activities of governments are frequently
too complex and multi-faceted to be analyzed effectively with such
imprecise instructions.
262. Id. at 567.
263. Id.
264. Id., (quoting U.N. Resolution 1803, G.A. Res. 1803, § I(1), 17 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 17) 107, U.N. Doc. A/C2/5R850 (1962)).
265. 477 F. Supp. at 568; see Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943).
266. 477 F. Supp. at 567-68.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 568. Plaintiff argued that, even if the activity at issue was governmental, the fact that several nations conspired to fix prices rendered the activity commercial. The court dismissed that agrument as "ridiculous." Id. at 569.
269. For example, OPEC's activities can be described correctly either as the
exploitation of natural resources by a sovereign or as the production and marketing of
oil. The former appears patently governmental, whereas the latter should be characterized as commercial. Because either description fits well within the FSIA schema,
the statute affords no effective means of distinguishing commercial from public acts.
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As the OPEC court noted, the appropriate description of an activity
should account for the legislative intent of the FSIA. The court failed,
however, to turn that principle into a meaningful guiding theory.
Such a theory would in the first instance require that courts consider
the policies underlying the statute when isolating and describing an
activity for purposes of determining immunity. The principal policy is
to balance the competing private and foreign state interests, extending
immunity only if the latter outweigh the former. Since the state
interest can usually be described as protecting a particular activity
from litigation and judicial inquiry, the description of an activity
should focus on the elements most directly threatened by the legal
proceeding at issue. Those elements account for the statutory policy
and therefore should be determinative of the commercial or noncommercial nature of an activity. Thus, the acts isolated and described
should be those which weigh most heavily in the foreign state's favor
when its interests are weighed against the private interest.
OPEC's activity, for example, comprises a number of elements,
including exploitation of natural resources, regulation of distribution,
pricing, marketing and taxation. OPEC's interest, naturally, is to
shield all of these acts from judicial scrutiny by a foreign court. The
American antitrust litigation, however, directly threatens only certain
aspects of the overall activity, namely the pricing and marketing
mechanism. Because that aspect appears patently commercial in nature, OPEC's activity should have been characterized as commercial
within the meaning of the FSIA.
The court's conclusion that OPEC's activity is governmental is not
wholly persuasive because the standards on vhich it relied provide no
meaningful basis for distinguishing commercial from public activities.
Those standards, as noted above, derive not from the FSIA but from
other domestic and international law evidencing that states have certain sovereign rights with respect to their natural resources. The
standards identified by the court establish that, under international
law, every state may develop its natural resources as it sees fit.
The principle that states have a sovereign right to perform certain
activities, however, does not determine whether those activities
should be actionable by private persons. Many activities that are
considered clearly actionable also fall within the category of acts that
a state can perform as a matter of sovereign right. For example, one
might establish through reasoning similar to that used in OPEC,
drawing on national and international law, that states have a sovereign right to organize and manage a national airline, or to promote
travel and tourism of foreigners in their country. Most courts would
say, however, that those activities are commercial and would deny
immunity for claims arising from them.2 70 Judge Hauk's analysis,
270. E.g., Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow, 481 F. Supp. 1056, 1061-65
(E.D.N.Y. 1979); Lan-Chile Airlines, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 296 So. 2d 498, 500 (Fla.
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which relies on the concept of a sovereign right, is thus not persuasive
as the formulation of a standard to distinguish commercial from
public activities.
Nevertheless, the court's reasoning carries considerable weight, for
it reveals the importance of the governmental interest at stake. The
principles that the court considered determinative in characterizing
an activity as governmental closely resemble descriptions of the defendant states' threatened interests. The focus on every state's sovereign right to develop its natural resources and the necessity of such
development for the improvement of national welfare27 ' highlight the
great significance of OPEC's activity in the context of its member
states' affairs. In effect, the court established that the activity implicated vital state interests and that international law recognizes and
approves the importance of those interests.
3. Suggested Remedies
If the FSIA included a saving clause as suggested above,272 the
OPEC case could have been resolved clearly and coherently. One
would first describe the activity at issue in terms of the state interest
most threatened by the legal action, focusing on the pricing and
marketing mechanism instituted by OPEC. Because that activity is
patently commercial, immunity would be denied under the normal
FSIA provisions.
The saving clause, however, would permit an analysis of the statutory policies as applied to the OPEC facts. The main policy is to
balance the competing interests and promote the one found more
significant. An evaluation of the interests at issue in the OPEC case
would disclose an extremely strong state interest, notwithstanding the
commercial context of the case. Failure to grant immunity would
defeat that vital interest and therefore negate the statutory policy.
Thus, one would extend immunity to OPEC for an essentially commercial activity.
The Act's present rigidity and its tightly knit, but overly general,
definitions prevented the OPEC court from using the analysis advocated here. Unable to find guidance in the statute, Judge Hauk naturally turned to an evaluation of interests and policies. That evaluation, however, had to be cast in the vocabulary and structure of the
FSIA, thus forcing the court to conclude unpersuasively that OPEC's
activities were not commercial and therefore were entitled to immuDist. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 310 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1975); Argentine Airlines v.
Ross, 64 A.D.2d 994, 408 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1978), cert. denied, 47 N.Y.2d 708, cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 973 (1979).
271. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 477 F.
Supp. 553, 567-68 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aJ'd, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981).
272. See supra notes 254 & 269 and accompanying text.
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nity. The resulting strained and inaccurate reasoning impedes the
development of coherent and articulate case law under the FSIA. 7 3
In the absence of a statutory amendment, the best remedy for the
problems discussed above is for courts to apply a form of judicial
activism in interpreting the Act. 274 They should recognize more explicitly than the statute does the competing interests at stake in determinations of immunity. The FSIA basically endorses a policy of balancing those interests, and courts can implement that legislative
intent most effectively by engaging in an interest analysis that transcends strict application of the statutory definitions. Indeed, the legislative history recognizes the need for judicial flexibility in this area.T s
The statutory exceptions, of course, are based on a particular bal-

ancing of interests that courts should not alter. At the same time, they
should not blindly apply the exceptions. The FSIA does not govern

simple and fixed situations, but sensitive and complex cases involving
highly polarized interests. Judges should therefore interpret the Act
flexibly in response to each factual setting, aiming for sound policy
results rather than strict construction of the definitions. The tightly

knit structure of the FSIA ensures that courts will not play too loosely
with those definitions.

The OPEC case, for example, could have been handled more effectively through explicit judicial activism. The court might have concluded that OPEC's activities are of a public nature, notwithstanding
their substantial commercial aspects. Although those activities are

undertaken largely in the form of commercial acts, they implicate
vital public interests. The latter are so significant, one might argue,

that they infuse and subsume the seemingly commercial acts and
convert them to public acts.
That analysis appears to constitute a return to the purpose test that

was discredited by the FSIA 2 16 It is true, of course, that interest
273. See Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978)
(antitrust action). In Pezetel, the court held the activity at issue (manufacture of golf
carts) to be commercial, so that the action could be maintained. Id. at 395-96. Under
the analysis advocated in this paper, OPEC and Pezetel can be distinguished in that
sensitive interests of the Polish government were not involved, thus making a denial
of immunity proper. OPEC, on the other hand, threatened crucial interests of the
defendant countries, thus requiring immunity. Indeed, on a different issue, the
Pezetel court stated that the inquiry into the defendant's activity would not involve
the political system of Poland or cause any embarrassment to the Polish government.
Id. at 398. Again, one finds a court cautiously feeling its way towards a form of
interest analysis, albeit in disguise.
274. For a jurisprudential argument generally in favor of judicial activism, see R.
Dworkin, ConstitutionalCases, in Taking Rights Seriously 131 (1977).
275. House Report, supra note 2, at 16, reprintedin 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 6615.
276. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976). This section requires courts to determine the
commercial nature of an activity by reference to its nature rather than to its purpose.
House Report, supra note 2, at 16, reprintedin 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
6614-15.
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analysis must inquire into the purposes of an activity to ascertain the
governmental interest at stake. The analysis, however, goes beyond
the purpose test in that it does not merely identify the public purposes
involved, but also evaluates them according to their importance. A
seemingly commercial act will be rendered public only if truly fundamental or essential state interests are implicated. If that condition is
met, one can reasonably maintain that the very nature of the act is
requirement of characterizing acts
public, thus meeting the statutory
277
by reference to their nature.
The foregoing discussion illustrates that courts can adopt a policy
analysis and interest balancing that will render the statutory criteria
more responsive to difficult cases. The suggested solution admittedly
invites complexity, if not uncertainty, in application of the FSIA.
Nevertheless, it is preferable to the incoherence and frustration of
policy resulting from the mechanistic application of the statutory
language to facts not readily analyzed in general terms. In addition,
that approach would give foreign states a means of demonstrating, in
some commercial contexts, that litigation threatens fundamental public interests. Cautiously applied, judicial activism in interpreting the
FSIA will yield sounder results than a strict construction of its terms.
C. Jurisdiction
1. The Statutory Scheme
The Act's approach to jurisdiction reflects an effort to simplify and
standardize prior law, but the new rules may be still more complex
and problematic. Prior law relied heavily on jurisdictional attachments for commencing an action because personal jurisdiction was
difficult to establish and no reliable means existed for serving process
on foreign states.2 78 That situation was imperfect in many ways, but
plaintiffs had accommodated themselves to it by bringing most actions
in rem or quasi in rem. Jurisdictional attachments, though inconvenient and cumbersome, were sure to give notice to the defendant state
satisfaction of judgments by executing
and sometimes facilitated the
2 79
attached..
property
the
upon
The FSIA attempts to establish a comprehensive jurisdictional
scheme for suits against foreign states. 280 Its elements include original
subject matter jurisdiction in the federal district courts2 8 ' and per-

277. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976).
278. See House Report, supra note 2, at 8, 23, reprintedin 1976 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News at 6606-07, 6622; supra pt. II(C)(1), (2).
279. Harris & Co. Advertising v. Cuba, 127 So. 2d 687 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
280. House Report, supra note 2, at 8, 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 6606, 6610.

281. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976).
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sonal jurisdiction over foreign states. 2 2 The FSIA provides for longarm jurisdiction to support the courts' exercise of adjudicatory power
over the parties, 28 3 and sets forth service of process rules for commencing actions against foreign states.2 8 4 28 5Finally, the statute includes
special venue and removal provisions.. 1
Congress eliminated the prior rules and bases of jurisdiction, intending the new scheme to be both comprehensive and exclusive.2"
To that end, the FSIA amends section 1332 of title 28, governing
diversity jurisdiction, to delete references to foreign states.2 7 Section
1332 was previously one of the main bases of federal subject matter
jurisdiction for actions against foreign governments.28
More importantly, the Act eliminates property attachments as a
method of subjecting a defendant state to the court's power. Sections
1609 and 1610 have the effect of prohibiting all attachments of foreign
states' property for jurisdictional purposes.28 9 In addition, section
1605(b) provides that in rem maritime liens against foreign countries'
vessels henceforth shall be considered in personam actions and may
not proceed through the seizure of a vessel.29 0 At the same time, the
Act's grant of subject matter jurisdiction is limited to in personam
29
claims. '
2. The Shift to Personal Jurisdiction
The main thrust of the new jurisdictional scheme is to focus on the
person of a foreign sovereign rather than its property. The legislative
history, however, raises the suspicion that the drafters lacked a thorough understanding of the core policies involved in that fundamental
conceptual change. Instead, they only perceived several gaps in prior
jurisdictional law that required correction.
For example, the Act's service of process procedures were explained
in the House Report as filling "a void in existing Federal and State

282. Id. § 1330(b).
283. Id. §§ 1605-1611; see House Report, suipra note 2, at 13, reprinted in 1976
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6612.
284. 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1976).
285. Id. §§ 1391(f), 1441.
286. House Report, supra note 2, at 12, 23, reprintedin 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 6610, 6622.
287. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976); House Report, supra note 2, at 14, reprintedin 1976
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6613.
288. See House Report, supra note 2, at 14, reprintedin 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 6613.
289. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609, 1610 (1976); House Report, supra note 2, at 26-27,
reprintedin 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6625-26.
290. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(b) (1976); House Report, supra note 2, at 21-2-2, reprinted
in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6620-21.
291. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

law, and [ensuring] that private persons have adequate means for
commencing a suit against a foreign state to seek redress in the
courts. ' 2 2 More generally, the legislative history justifies the new
jurisdictional scheme as "conducive to uniformity in decision, which is
desirable since a disparate treatment of cases involving foreign
gov2 93
ernments may have adverse foreign relations consequences.
Those observations are not very illuminating and hardly justify as
sweeping a change in jurisdictional rules as the Act effected. Both
comments reflect a desire to address specific problems of prior lawthe difficulty of commencing suit and the lack of uniformity. Those
problems were unquestionably significant and required correction.
Their solution, however, cannot be effective unless based on a comprehensive understanding of the subtle interrelations among various
aspects of sovereign immunity law. The drafters appeared to lack that
understanding or to belittle its significance. As a result, the FSIA
generally reflects a simplistic and superficial strategy, most glaring in
its treatment of jurisdiction. 9 4 A prime example of that problem is
the Act's naive fusion of subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdic295
tion, and the criteria of immunity.
A more thorough analysis by the drafters would have, at a minimum, evaluated and compared the respective effects of the two basic
forms of jurisdiction, in rem and in personam, on the competing
interests. That analysis would have furnished a means for determining
whether a jurisdictional scheme focusing on persons balanced those
interests better than the former scheme's reliance on property. Alternatively, the analysis would have suggested that the most effective
jurisdictional system might be one which combines elements from
2 96
both schemes.
3. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
a. Structuralfeatures
A fundamental feature of the FSIA is that it establishes federal
subject matter jurisdiction for actions involving foreign states and
their political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities.2 9 7 Under
prior law, subject matter jurisdiction could almost always be based on
section 1332, governing diversity jurisdiction, if no other jurisdictional
ground was available.2 98 The FSIA substantially complicates that
292. House Report, supra note 2, at 23, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 6622.
293. Id. at 13, reprintedin 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6611.
294, For an excellent analysis and critique of the Act's jurisdictional scheme, see
Smit I, supra note 159.
295. Smit I, supra note 159, at 50-60, 62-63, 69-70.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 130-34, 163-69.
297. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976).
298. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1976) extended jurisdiction to actions between "citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state." Id.; see National Am. Corp.
v. Nigeria, 425 F. Supp. 1365, 1368 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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situation. It extends subject matter jurisdiction to any in personam
claim with respect to which the defendant state is not entitled to
immunity under sections 1605 through 1607. ' 99 That limitation on
subject matter jurisdiction has the unusual effect of fusing substance
and procedure because the procedural issue of jurisdiction is made
contingent upon a substantive inquiry into the grounds for immu300
nity.
At first glance, that structure appears to be a simplifying measure
because it reduces separate questions to a single inquiry. That simplicity is deceptive, however, for the resolution of several secondary issues
depends upon distinguishing subject matter jurisdiction from other
jurisdictional requirements and substantive determinations. Those
subsidiary issues include, for example, res judicata, collateral estoppel, the timing of raising a jurisdictional objection and determining
who may raise the objection. 30 1 If it is unclear whether dismissal of a
case was based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a grant of
immunity, it becomes difficult to judge whether the dismissal is a
proper basis for collateral estoppel in another action. In addition, the
tie-in of subject matter jurisdiction with the grounds of immunity has
the unprecedented result of permitting the parties to create subject
matter jurisdiction
by agreement, by means of the defendant's waiver
30 2
of immunity.
Subject matter jurisdiction is not readily analyzed in terms of the
competing interests of private plaintiffs and foreign state defendants.
It concerns the competence of a court to adjudicate certain claims
rather than amenability to suit or capacity to sue. 30 3 Accordingly, a
policy analysis of subject matter jurisdiction should focus on the efficient operation of the judicial system and fair administration of justice. From the litigants' point of view, the rules of subject matter
jurisdiction should be simple, clear, and uniform to allow the predictability of the outcome of secondary issues, such as those mentioned
above,4 and for properly timing a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdic30
tion.
The FSIA does not achieve those objectives very effectively. As one
commentator suggests, a simple declaration that subject matter jurisdiction shall be available for all actions involving foreign states would
299. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976) limits subject matter jurisdiction "'to any claim
for relief in personam."
300. Numerous courts have commented on the fusion of substance and procedure.
E.g., Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow, 481 F. Supp. 1056, 1065 (E.D.N.Y. 1979);
Upton v. Iran, 459 F. Supp. 264, 265 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd men., 607 F.2d 494
(D.C. Cir. 1979); Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849, 851
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
301. See Smit I, supra note 159, at 52-58.
302. Id. at 60.
303. See M. Rosenberg, J. Weinstein, H. Smit & H. Korn, Elements of Civil
Procedure 209 (1976).
304. See Smit I, supra note 159, at 58, 61.
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The FSIA actually worsens the conditions

existing under prior law, which rarely raised problems of subject
matter jurisdiction. Thus, the Act fails to achieve its own stated policy

of promoting uniformity and simplicity.
b. The elimination of in rem and quasi in rem actions
Subject matter jurisdiction under section 1330 is limited to in per-

sonam claims.30 6 Because the Act is the exclusive basis for subject

matter jurisdiction over claims against foreign states, federal courts no
longer have competence7 to adjudicate in rem and quasi in rem actions
30
against foreign states.
This feature of the Act is subject to an important qualification.

Section 1605(b) declares by simple fiat that a "maritime lien shall...

be deemed to be an in personam claim against the foreign state."3 0 In

addition, this section alters certain aspects of admiralty actions in rem
against foreign states to conform them to in personam procedures. For

example, arrests of vessels are prohibited, 3 9 and service of process
must be made in the same manner as in in personam actions.31 0

Significantly, section 1605(b) requires that any judgment be limited to
the value of the vessel or cargo that would have been attached if
maritime liens were permissible, 31' thus preserving the most important feature of the in rem proceeding. In effect, section 1605(b) pre-

serves the admiralty in rem action in the guise of an in personam
claim, whereas other in rem proceedings are precluded.
The legislative history does not explain this two-tiered approach to
in rem actions. Evidently, the legislators felt that the availability of
very broad bases of in personam jurisdiction and the long-arm provi-

sions rendered in rem and quasi in rem actions generally unneces-

sary. 312 Furthermore, such actions are ordinarily commenced by
attachment of property, a procedure which the drafters strongly disfavored. 31 3 Those factors suggested the simultaneous elimination of
305. Id. at 64-66.
306. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976).
307. See Smit I, supra note 159, at 56-60.
308. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(b) (1976).
309. Id. § 1605(b)(1); House Report, supra note 2, at 21-22, reprinted in 1976
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6620-21.
310. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(b)(2) (1976).

311. Id. § 1605(b).
312. See id. § 1609; House Report, supra note 2, at 13, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6611-12; von Mehren, supra note 4, at 46-47.
313. House Report, supra note 2, at 8, 26-27, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News at 6606, 6625-26. The Report states that jurisdictional attachments are
rendered unnecessary by the liberal service and jurisdictional provisions of the bill.
Id. at 27, reprintedin 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6625-26; see Carl, supra
note 4, at 1021-22; Sovereign Immunity, supra note 4, at 443; of. Jet Line Servs. v.
M/V Marsa El Hariga, 462 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Md. 1978) (plaintiff barred from suit
because he had arrested vessel contrary to FSIA).
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prejudgment attachments and all in rem actions. It may have become
apparent to the drafters, however, that the new bases of in personam
jurisdiction, as broad as they are, do not offer an effective substitute
for admiralty in rem actions. 4 The latter often involve defendants
who cannot be reached with long-arm jurisdiction, their only contact
with the forum being the presence of a vessel they own.31 5 Moreover,
disputes involving foreign states often arise from shipping transactions
or accidents caused by vessels. Those factors had made the maritime
lien one of the most frequently invoked procedures in actions against
foreign states. 31 6 Thus, it was undesirable to abandon admiralty in
rem actions along with the general preclusion of in rem proceedings.
The obvious solution was to preserve the maritime lien but convert it
to an in personam claim in order to keep intact the policy
of avoiding
317
jurisdictional attachments of foreign states' property.
If the foregoing analysis is correct, the legislators were striving for a
delicate balancing of foreign states' interests and private interests. The
interest of foreign governments in avoiding the paralyzing effect of
property attachment conflicted directly with plaintiffs' interests in
preserving the admiralty in rem action. The legislative solution to this
conflict was to permit the latter actions, but prohibit their commencement by attachment. Maritime in rem actions were simply recast in
an in personam guise, although still limited to in rem recovery.
That solution and the Act's general exclusion of in rem cases have
been criticized on a number of grounds. One commentator notes the
conceptual inconsistency of generally prohibiting in rem suits while
permitting them in admiralty. 3 8 He also suggests that in some cases
the in rem bases of jurisdiction may balance more finely the defendant's and plaintiffs interests than do the in personam rules.3 19
It is difficult to establish definitively whether in rem proceedings
offer advantages that have not been built into the new in personam
scheme. The in rem action protected foreign states by limiting their
exposure to the value of the property attached, giving clear notice of
the commencement of legal action, and providing the constitutionally
314. Von Mehren, supra note 4, at 46-48.
315. See House Report, supra note 2, at 26-27, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News at 6625-26.
316. See Rabinowitz, Immunity of State-Owned Ships and Barratry, 1962 J. Bus.
L. 89 (1962); JurisdictionalImmunity, supra note 3, at 1150-52. For a more extensive
survey covering other countries, see Brandon, Sovereign Immunity of GovernmentOwned Corporationsand Ships, 39 Cornell L.Q. 425 (1954).
317. See Smit I, supra note 159, at 54-56. But see von Mehren, supra note 4, at
47-48 (criticism of maritime liens in form of in personam claims).
318. Smit I, supra note 159, at 54-56, 67.
319. Id. at 69; see Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi In Rein Jurisdiction,
76 Harv. L. Rev. 303 (1962); Smit, The Enduring Utility of In Rein Rules: A Lasting
Legacy of Pennoyer v. Neff, 43 Brooklyn L. Rev. 600 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Smit II].
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required nexus with the forum. At the same time, it served plaintiff's
interests by affording a sure means to institute legal action, virtually
guaranteeing a responsive appearance by the foreign state, and encouraging satisfaction of the judgment, at least to the extent of the
property attached. The FSIA, however, also achieves those objectives,
although not in precisely the same form. Thus, one probably cannot
find a distinct and persuasive policy reason for generally retaining in
rem actions. The exception is maritime in rem actions, which are not
adequately covered by the in personam rules and which the drafters
therefore retained in the FSIA.
The foregoing considerations, however, do not inevitably lead to
the elimination of in rem actions. Since the major historical disadvantage of the in rem action-harassment of foreign states through jurisdictional property attachment-was eliminated in the FSIA, that
form of action has been rendered harmless from the point of view of
immunity policy. Accordingly, the in rem action should have been
retained if it offers even slight benefits, or if its elimination causes
excessive complexity. Sufficient benefits might be found in the suggestion that, in some cases, in rem actions balance competing interests
more finely than do in personam actions. In rem actions should thus
be reexamined along the lines of that suggestion and the FSIA should
possibly be amended to permit in rem actions against foreign states, as
long as they are not commenced through property attachment.
Naturally, extending subject matter jurisdiction to include in rem
actions would be meaningful only if a means exists for instituting
them without attachment. The FSIA's treatment of maritime liens
indicates that the legislators can conceive of in rem actions without
the necessity of property attachment, notwithstanding that they felt
compelled to label them "in personam."
A puzzling problem related to the Act's in rem treatment results
from the interaction between removal and subject matter jurisdiction.
While new section 1330 limits subject matter jurisdiction to in personam claims against foreign states, section 1441(d) permits removal
from state to federal court of any "civil action . . . against a foreign
state. ' 320 An in rem action can thus be pursued in federal court if
32

first commenced in state court and then removed to federal court. 1
Arguably, in rem actions cannot be instituted in state court because
the Act prohibits prejudgment attachments for jurisdictional purposes. This prohibition applies to both federal and state courts and, as
a practical matter, is likely to eliminate all in rem actions. Attachment of property, however, may not be a constitutional prerequisite
to the exercise of in rem jurisdiction. 32

2

Accordingly, states could

320. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1976); House Report, supra note 2, at 32-33, reprinted
in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6631-32.
321. See Smit I,supra note 159, at 55.
322. Id. at 55-56.
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provide that in rem actions may be instituted without attachment of
property.
The possibility thus exists of removing to federal court in rem
actions that could not originally have been brought there. The federal
rules were amended in 1963 to eliminate precisely this result for in
rem actions in general. 323 The FSIA reintroduces that anomaly, with
its attendant undesirable forum-shopping implications, for actions
against foreign states. No rationale is readily discernible to justify that
disparate treatment of in rem actions against foreign states.
Foreign governments have a number of special interests that justify
preferential consideration in the removal area. For example, they
require uniformity of treatment as provided at the federal level, as
well as heightened sensitivity to their governmental status and their
lack of familiarity with United States lavs.32 4 Those factors justify

the liberal removal provisions of the FSIA, such as extensions of time
for filing removal petititons and the allowance of removal when
multiple defendants would otherwise make it impossible. 3- The special interests of foreign states in removal of actions are as equally
operative for in rem actions as for other kinds of actions. Therefore, it
appears reasonable to permit removal of in rem actions.
This anomaly should thus not be traced to an overly liberal removal
provision, but rather stems from the fact that in rem actions were
eliminated in federal court but remained possible in state courts. The
critical question is whether the policy supporting the elimination of
federal in rem actions is equally applicable to state in rem actions.
Arguably it is not, and this would justify retention of in rem actions in
state court.
The factors leading to the elimination of federal in rem actions
were the policy against jurisidictional attachments and the superfluousness of in rem proceedings after the expansion of in personam
jurisdiction. In the single instance of an in rem proceeding that had
not been rendered superfluous, the legislators retained it in a modified
form which left intact the policy against property attachments26 At

the state level, however, in personam jurisdiction over foreign states
remains dependent on state law and may be relatively narrow, or at
least unclear, in some instances. As a result, there is a strong possibility that in rem proceedings will continue to play an important role in
the context of legal action against foreign states. It is thus appropriate
for the FSIA not to preclude them, notwithstanding the anomaly
caused by their possible removal to federal court. In any event, as a
323. Id. at 55.

324. Gray v. Permanent Mission of the Congo to the U.N.. 443 F. Supp. 816, 821
(S.D.N.Y.), afj'd mem., 580 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1978): House Report, supra note 2,
at 32, reprintedin 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6631.
325. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1976).
326. See supra notes 292-303 and accompanying text.
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practical matter, the elimination of prejudgment attachments pre-

cludes the commencement of state in rem actions, at least in the
immediate future. Consequently, the removal of an in rem case to
federal court is likely to be an extremely rare occurrence.
The FSIA might have avoided most of the above described complexities by permitting federal in rem actions as a general rule. 32 7 The

benefit gained from their elimination is minimal, because the policy
of protecting foreign states' property from seizure is fully embodied in
the prohibition of jurisdictional attachment. Prohibiting in rem suits
adds nothing to that policy. The simple deletion of the words "for
relief in personam" from section 1330(a) would restore the in rem
action and substantially simplify the Act's jurisdictional scheme.
4. Personal Jurisdiction
a. Jurisdictionalcontacts
Section 1330(b) provides that personal jurisdiction over foreign
states exists if the claim is one over which the district court has

original jurisdiction under section 1330(a) and if adequate service has
been made under section 1608.328 This dual requirement for personal

jurisdiction embodies the standards of International Shoe Co. 33v.°
Washington3 9 and McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,
which condition personal jurisdiction on minimum contacts between
the defendant
and the forum state and on adequate notice to the
33 1
defendant.
The minimum jurisdictional contacts required by the FSIA are
contained in the exceptions to immunity, set forth in sections 1605
through 1607.332 Those exceptions include actions based on any of
327. See Smit I, supra note 159, at 65-67. Professor Smit argues for retention of in
rem actions against foreign states in federal court. Id. It should be noted that the
FSIA approach to prejudgment attachments should be reevaluated in the event that
in rem actions are again permitted. Although Congress may not wish to return to the
pre-FSIA era of liberal attachment, it may wish to permit the institution of In rem
proceedings through some attachment procedure specially designed to account for
foreign states' interests. After all, the most basic function of prejudgment attachments has traditionally been the commencement of an in rem proceeding. Compare
Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation, 459 F.
Supp. 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (quasi in rem action commenced just prior to Act's
effective date), afJ'd, 605 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1979) and National Am. Corp. v.
Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (same), af'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979)
with Jet Line Servs. v. M/V Marsa El Hariga, 462 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Md. 1978)
(vacated attachment of property owned by foreign government's agent).
328. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (1976); House Report, supra note 2, at 13-14, reprinted
in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6611-12.
329. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
330. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
331. House Report, supra note 2, at 13, reprintedin 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 6612.
332. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605-1607 (1976).
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the following: (i) a waiver by the foreign state; (ii) a commercial
activity having substantial contact with the United States; (iii) an act
performed in the United States in connection with a commercial
activity elsewhere; (iv) an act performed outside the United States in
connection with a commercial activity outside the United States if
that act causes a direct effect in the United States; (v) rights in
property in the United States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United States, if that property was taken in
violation of international lav; (vi) rights in property in the United
States acquired by gift or succession; (vii) rights in immovable property in the United States; (viii) certain tortious acts or omissions
causing injury or damage in the United States, but excluding certain
kinds of torts; (ix) maritime liens based on commercial activity; and
(x) counterclaims or setoffs to legal 333
action by the foreign state in a
court of the United States or a state.
The legislative history provides little guidance on the factors that
influenced formulation of the Act's long-arm provisions. Although the
House Report discusses each of the exceptions to immunity, it focuses
on their implications for immunity, rather than for personal jurisdiction. 334 The latter is addressed only briefly in stating that the FSIA

incorporates a federal long-arm statute over foreign states, patterned
on the one enacted for the District of Columbia. 33 .

In addition, the

legislators stated that they intended the Act to meet the requirements
of minimum jurisdictional contacts and adequate notice embodied in
InternationalShoe and McGee. 33 6' The House Report states that each

of the statutory immunity provisions requires either a connection
between the lawsuit and the United States or a waiver by the foreign
state of its immunity from jurisdiction. 337

Finally, the drafters of-

fered a brief discussion of the jurisdictional contacts required by each
of the three commercial-act bases of jurisdiction. 338

A major weakness of this approach is the fusion of different concepts. The various statutory interconnections make the provisions of
sections 1605 through 1607 determinative of subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and immunity. This scheme places too
heavy a burden on a single set of criteria that cannot possibly account
for the different policies underlying three distinct concepts. Subject
333. Id. For discussions of these provisions and cases decided thereunder, see Carl,
supra note 4, at 1015-21; Kahale & Vega, supra note 4, at 244-52; see generally Note,
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Direct Effects and Minim urn Contacts, 14 Cornell Int'l L. J. 97 (1981); Note, Direct Effect Jurisdiction Under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 13 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 571 (1981).
334. House Report, supra note 2, at 17-23, reprintedin 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 6615-22.
335. Id. at 13, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6612.
336. Id.
337. Id. But see id. at 17-19, reprintedin 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
6615-18 (discussion concerning the jurisdictional nexus between a foreign state's
commercial activities and the United States).
338. Id. at 16-17, reprintedin 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6614-16.
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matter jurisdiction focuses on efficient administration of justice; personal jurisdiction is concerned with the substantiality of contacts and
service of process; and immunity looks to the public nature of the acts
and property at issue.
Section 1605(a)(1), for example, deals with waivers of immunity by
foreign states. If such a waiver exists, section 1605(a) properly makes
immunity unavailable. The existence of a waiver also confers subject
matter jurisdiction under section 1330(a). Subject matter jurisdiction,
however, should not depend on the defendant's consent or on agreement of the parties. At the same time, the waiver establishes personal
jurisdiction under section 1330(b), assuming there was proper service
of process. This result is also inappropriate because a waiver of immunity is not the functional equivalent of consent to jurisdiction.3 09
Under the FSIA, a waiver clause in a contract made and performed
entirely outside the United States would confer federal long-arm jurisdiction. This result would unpleasantly surprise a defendant with no
United States contacts who expected merely to waive the immunity
defense and on that basis is forced to litigate in a distant forum.340
The FSIA thus may create too broad a basis of long-arm jurisdiction
that raises constitutional questions and forces federal courts to adjudicate cases having little connection with the United States. 341 While
the legislators intended to meet the constitutional requirements set
forth in InternationalShoe and McGee, they ignored that those cases
arose in an interstate and national context. The minimum standards
established were premised on the increase of interstate commerce and
communication, the dominance of a national economy, and a freedom of movement which greatly diminishes the inconvenience of
defending in another state. These factors made it possible for the
Supreme Court to relax the contacts requirement and instead focus on
purposes of subjecting an out-of-state defendant
adequate notice for
342
to judicial power.

339. Compare Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284,
1300-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (waiver of immunity in foreign courts is not equivalent to
consent to United States jurisdiction), aff'd, 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981) with
Ipitrade Int'l v. Nigeria, 465 F. Supp. 824, 826 (D.D.C. 1978) (jurisdiction based on
waiver of immunity in foreign tribunal, but court also noted existence of treaty).
340. See Waukesha Engine Div., Dresser Americas, Inc. v. Banco Nacional de
Fomento Cooperativo, 485 F. Supp. 490, 493 (E.D. Wis. 1980). In this case, the
court dismissed a contract action for lack of minimal jurisdictional contacts. If the
contract had included a waiver of immunity clause, without a consent to jurisdiction,
the FSIA arguably would recognize personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
341. See Carl, supra note 4, at 1058-63; Note, Sovereign Immunity, supra note 4,
at 439-40.
342. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-24 (1957). In
this case, the Court referred to "the fundamental transformation of our national
economy," id. at 222, and reasoned that "modern transportation and communication
have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself In a State
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These factors are not yet present at the international level. Interna-

tional commerce and communication have not developed to a point
where it is legitimate to equate the United States economy with the

world economy for purposes of subjecting foreign defendants to the
power of United States courts. The world economy does not dominate

national economies to the same extent that the American economy
dominates state economies. In addition, defending in a foreign coun-

try is significantly more cumbersome and inconvenient for a foreign
state than defending in another state is for a United States national. In
view of these considerations, due process may require more jurisdictional contacts in the international context than in the domestic context to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction. InternationalShoe
and McGee may not be proper standards for evaluating
the constitu343
tionality of the Act as regards personal jurisdiction.
Another criticism of the statute's long-arm provisions is that they
34
create an undesirable discrepancy between federal and state law.

Prior to enactment of the FSIA, the rules of personal jurisdiction were
usually determined by state law because suits against foreign states
were commonly based on federal diversity jurisdiction. To a large
extent, state law also governed federal question cases in regard to
personal jurisdiction. 3 45 The advantage of this system was that a
lawyer practicing in a particular state dealt with only one set of rules.

Under the FSIA, however, federal personal jurisdiction depends
upon the immunity provisions of sections 1605 through 1607, whereas

states will continue to apply their own personal jurisdiction rules. 3 6
Of course, questions of immunity and service of process are governed

where he engages in economic activity." Id. at 223; cf. World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (due process requires defendant to have
minimum contacts with forum state such that maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice); International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945) (same).
343. Recent cases, however, have referred precisely to International Shoe and
McGee in evaluating due process as regards suits against foreign states. E.g., Thos. P.
Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Naci6nal de Produccion de Costa Rica, 614 F.2d 1247,
1250-52 (9th Cir. 1980); East Europe Domes. Int'l Sales Corp. v. Terra, 467 F. Supp.
383, 388-89 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd mem., 610 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1979). This treatment is
inspired by legislative references to InternationalShoe and McGee. House Report,
supra note 2, at 13, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6612. But see
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284, 1295 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(court noted that the FSIA jurisdictional provisions are "much narrower" than the
"farthest reaches permitted by the due process clause" as applied to some domestic
long-arm statutes), af'd, 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981).
344. Smit I, supra note 159, at 64.
345. Id.
346. Because states do not base personal jurisdiction on § 1330(b), which incorporates the immunity criteria, but rather on their own jurisdictional statutes, the states'
long-arm provisions are not affected by the federal immunity provisions. See Smit I,
supra note 159, at 64.
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by the Act in both state and federal courts. 3 7 A case might arise,

therefore, in which a foreign state is denied immunity under the FSIA
and consequently is subject to federal in personam jurisdiction, while
it might be beyond a state's jurisdictional reach under a different set
of state rules. This complex dual system of personal jurisdiction created by the FSIA causes a lack of uniformity that may lead to forum
states regarding their amenability
shopping and may confuse foreign
348
to suit in the United States.

Finally, the Act's long-arm scheme can be criticized as being too
narrow in that it fails to include "doing business" in the United States
as a basis of jurisdiction. This defect is illustrated by Harris v. VAO
Intourist, Moscou, 349 a wrongful death action brought in New York to
recover for the death of a tourist in a Moscow hotel fire. In personam
jurisdiction could not be based on the Act's exception for tortious
conduct, because that provision requires that the act or omission
causing injury occur within the United States.
The three variants of the commercial activity basis were also unsatisfactory. Although the claim was based on an act outside the United
States related to a commercial activity outside the United States, it
could not be said to have a direct effect in this country. Likewise,
plaintiffs claim could not be related to a commercial activity having
substantial contact with the United States. Nor could the claim be said
to be based on an 35act
in the United States related to a commercial
0
activity elsewhere.

Judge Weinstein noted that the usual basis of in personam jurisdiction for tourists injured abroad was the defendant's doing business in
the United States.:351 In personam jurisdiction is ordinarily sustained
on that basis even if the plaintiff's claim is not related to that business.
In Harris, the defendant was unquestionably "doing business" in the
United States, but the Act's circumscription of "commercial activity"
does not make doing business a general basis of in personam jurisdiction for claims not related to that
business. Judge Weinstein therefore
35 2
regretfully dismissed the case.

347. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1605, 1607, 1608 (1976).
348. Smit I, supra note 159, at 64. Although states use their own long-arm system,
they must use the FSIA service of process method. See, e.g., 40 D 6262 Realty Corp.
v. United Arab Emirates Gov't, 447 F. Supp. 710, 711-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Gray v.
Permanent Mission of the Congo to the U.N., 443 F. Supp. 816, 819 (S.D.N.Y.), aJJ'd
mem., 580 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1978).
349. 481 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); see Smit [, supra note 159, at 60.
350. 481 F. Supp. at 1061.
351. Id. at 1059-60.
352. Id. at 1065-66.
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b. Service of process
Section 1608353 establishes the methods of serving process on foreign
states and governs both federal and state courts. It creates a hierarchical scheme among several means of serving process. The preferred
methods are in accordance with any special arrangement between
plaintiff and the foreign state or, if no such arrangement exists, in
accordance with any applicable international convention. If service
cannot be made by those methods, section 1608 requires service to be
made by return receipt mail to be dispatched by the clerk of the court
to the head of the foreign affairs ministry of the foreign state. If
service cannot be made through that method within thirty days, the
plaintiff may have the clerk of the court send the documents to be
served to the State Department, which is directed to transmit them to
the foreign state through diplomatic channels.
Both of the latter methods of service require that the documents be
accompanied by a translation into the official language of the state to
be served. In addition, plaintiffs must send along with the documents
a "Notice of Suit" addressed to the foreign state and in a form prescribed by the Secretary of State. The State Department has3 published
regulations concerning service of process on foreign states. 5
Section 1608 includes several other provisions. These impose special
procedures for serving process on agencies or instrumentalities of foreign states 3 55 including, significantly, service "by order of the court
consistent with the law of the place where service is to be made."3 ' In
addition, section 1608 sets a sixty-day time period for the foreign
state, its agency, or instrumentality to answer 335 and establishes certain conditions for entering default judgments. ss
The House Report states that section 1608 is intended to fill the
previously existing void in state and federal law. 5 9 Prior to enactment of the FSIA, the principal obstacle to commencing an in per353. 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1976); see House Report, supra note 2, at 23-26, reprinted
in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6622-25.
354. 22 C.F.R. §§ 93.1-.2 (1980): see also U.S. Dep't State, Memorandum on
Judicial Assistance under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Service of
Process upon a Foreign State (May 10, 1979), reprinted in 18 Int'l Legal Mar'Is 1177
(1979) (regarding State Department responsibility to serve process on foreign government defendants under the FSIA); Letter from Lee R. Marks, Deputy Legal Adviser
of State Dep't, to Charles N. Brower (June 15, 1979), reprinted in 18 Int'l Legal
Mat'ls 1184 (1979) (regarding transmittal of foreign states' diplomatic notes to United
States courts).
355. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b) (1976).
356. Id. § 1608(b)(3)(C).
357. Id. § 1608(d).
358. Id. § 1608(e). The claimant must establish his claim or right to relief "by
evidence satisfactory to the court." Id.
359. House Report, supra note 2, at 23, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 6622.
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sonam action against foreign states was that no certain method of
service of process existed. 360

The FSIA remedies that defect and at

the same time eliminates the two major methods previously used for
commencement of an action: attachment of a foreign state's property,3 1 and mailing
of documents to a diplomatic mission or foreign
36 2
representative.

One criticism which has been made of the Act's service provisions is
that they invite unnecessary complexity by departing from Federal
Rule 4(i), governing service on foreign defendants, and by relying on
foreign law. 3 3 This criticism does not withstand close scrutiny. Rule
4(i), like other service of process rules, reflects a balancing of plaintiffs and defendant's respective interests in the fair commencement
and notice of legal action. 3 4 The drafters of Rule 4(i), however, did

not have in mind a foreign government defendant. The latter's interets, in the context of service of process, are significantly more
complex than those of a private foreign defendant. For example, the
cumbersome machinery of a government bureaucracy may not accommodate legal action as readily as can a private entity. Moreover,
service on a state requires greater sensitivity to diplomatic and foreign
relations factors than does service on private persons.36

5

These factors justify a departure from Rule 4(i) and the adoption of
special service of process provisions, even at the cost of greater complexity and unusual difficulties for the plaintiff. Section 1608 essentially reflects a fair balancing of interests. The plaintiff is assured of
the ability to commence legal action, but consideration
is given to the
36
special interests of foreign government defendants.
Section 1608, however, is subject to another criticism. Evidence
exists that the service of process methods required in the absence of3 1a7
treaty or special arrangement do not function well in practice.
360. Id. at 23, 27, reprintedin 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6622, 6626;
see supra pt. II (C)(2).
361. House Report, supra note 2, at 8, 26-27, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News at 6606, 6624-26. The use of the in rem procedure to start a suit
provided the jurisdictional contact required as a matter of due process, because
attachment is based on the presence of property within the forum.
362. House Report, supra note 2, at 26, reprintedin 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 6625.
363. Smit I, supra note 159, at 66.
364. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i) is discussed in 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure: Civil §§ 1133-1136 (1969 & Supp. 1980). See generally Miller, supra
note 163, at 121-39 (extensive treatment of this rule).
365. See Gray v. Permanent Mission of the Congo to the U.N., 443 F. Supp. 816,
820-21 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd mem., 580 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1978).
366. The House Report reflects the drafters' awareness of those special interests in
the statement that "section 1608 follows on the precedents of other statutory service
provisions in areas of unusual Federal interest." House Report, supra note 2, at
23-24, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6622.
367. See Carl, supra note 4, at 1022-28.
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Return-receipt mail to foreign states will often be ineffective in that
the state may simply fail to return the receipt. Resort to the State
Department may also be difficult because of potential delays or mishandling of documents transmitted through diplomatic channels and
because of tensions in relations between states. 0
In addition, the
Department's assigned role as courier in legal disputes could adversely
affect sensitive dealings in other areas of foreign policy, with inevitable effects on its handling of the documents to be served.3 6 9 In light of
these practical difficulties, two courts recently fashioned a novel
method of service by telex that clearly appears to be contrary to the
370
FSIA.
If these misgivings are confirmed in future cases, section 1608 will
ultimately fail as an effort to reconcile the interests of the plaintiff and
the foreign state. While it succeeds in accounting for those of the latter
through complex procedures and State Department involvement, that
effort could defeat the aim of giving the plaintiff a sure method of
commencing legal action. The cumbersome requirements of section
1608 can be justified only if sensitivity to the interests of foreign states
is balanced with the assurance that plaintiffs will have access to court.
If section 1608 fails in that regard, it should be amended to provide
for another method that satisfies the competing interests.
5. Suggested Remedies
The problems inherent in the Act's jurisdictional scheme fall
roughly into three categories. First, the fusion of different concepts
into the criteria for immunity ignores important differences among
the policies underlying those concepts. This is evidenced by the possibility that a waiver of immunity can create both subject matter and
personal jurisdiction. Second, the failure to appreciate interrelations
among various elements of the jurisdictional scheme results in poor
coordination. For example, the drafters did not understand the full
ramifications of eliminating in rem actions, and as a result drafted
complex and problematic provisions on removal and maritime liens.

368. This would be the case in actions against Iran, for example, because the
United States maintains no diplomatic relations with that country. Accordingly, all
diplomatic communications are handled through the embassies of third countries.
369. The State Department would have a natural tendency to delay serving
documents if it is involved in sensitive dealing with the country to be served. In
effect, the Department's obligation to perform service of process could lead to a
conflict of interests within the Department, since the discharge of that obligation
could interfere with other foreign tasks.
370. International Schools Serv. v. Iran, 505 F. Supp. 178, 178-79 (D.N.J. 1981);
New Eng. Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission Co., 495
F. Supp. 73, 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); see also Note, Jurisdiction-Service of Process on
Iran, 21 Harv. Int'l L.J. 775 (1980).
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Third, many of the Act's provisions create difficulties when put into
practice. The service of process provisions illustrate that defect.
A comprehensive remedy to these problems would disentangle the
different concepts, coordinate them more effectively, and attempt to
work out the practical defects. These efforts should go hand-in-hand
31
because they are unlikely to succeed independently of each other. 7
Subject matter jurisdiction is a simple concept which can easily be
isolated from other aspects of the FSIA. Most importantly, it should
not be tied to the criteria for immunity. Instead, federal courts should
be given original subject matter jurisdiction for all actions involving
foreign states. Secondly, subject matter jurisdiction should be extended to in rem actions, thus eliminating the need to convert maritime liens to in personam claims. In addition, the provision on removal would not present an anomaly if in rem actions can be brought,
without jurisdictional attachment, in federal court in the first instance.
Personal jurisdiction should also be isolated from the criteria for
immunity. An independent basis of personal jurisdiction should incorporate the dual requirements of a sufficient nexus between the forum
and the foreign state, and adequate notice to the latter.
The long-arm provisions should require sufficiently substantial contacts to make it reasonable for the forum to exercise its judicial power
over a foreign state, but subject to the consideration that due process
may be more exacting in an international, rather than a domestic,
context. At the same time, the jurisdictional bases should be broad
enough to reach states "doing business" in the United States for virtually any claim against them. If it is considered desirable to limit the
kinds of claims that may be brought against foreign states, such
limitations should be incorporated into the separate provisions on
immunity rather than into the long-arm provision.
The service of process provisions should ensure access to court and
notice, while displaying sensitivity to the special interests of foreign
government defendants. They should not be so complex, however,
that a plaintiff's ability to commence suit is seriously impaired. The
present provisions achieve those goals reasonably well, although they
may require revision to function more smoothly in practice.
D. Enforcement of Judgments
1. The Statutory Scheme
The FSIA makes considerable progress in solving the pre-1977 problems of foreign states' immunity from execution and plaintiffs' result371. See Smit I, supra note 159, at 69-70 (further remedies). An instructive model
is also provided in the British State Immunity Act, 1978, which is conceptually more
logical than the FSIA in keeping distinct the concepts of jurisdiction and immunity.
The British Act also grants a broader basis for personal jurisdiction. The State
Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33.
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ing inability to enforce judgments.3

72

The Act adopts a restrictive

version of immunity from execution, subjecting commercial property
to execution in certain instances. The circumstances in which immunity from execution is available, however, are more extensive than
those in which immunity from suit is available. Thus, some plaintiffs
will find themselves unable to enforce valid judgments. 373 Neverthe-

are appropriate advances in
less, the statutory provisions on 3execution
74
the law of sovereign immunity.
Section 1609 sets forth a general rule of immunity from execution

for the property of foreign states, subject to certain exceptions. 3 5 The

exceptions are listed in section 1610, which establishes separate
schemes for foreign states and agencies or instrumentalities. 37

6

As

regards foreign states, the exceptions apply only to property located in
the United States and used for a commercial activity in the United
States.37 7 Subject to those important provisos, property may be seized

for execution if (i) the foreign state has waived immunity, (ii) the
property to be seized is used for the commercial activity upon which a
plaintiffs claim is based, (iii) the judgment to be executed establishes
rights in property taken in violation of international law, (iv) the
judgment to be executed establishes rights in immovable property or
in property acquired by succession or gift, or (v) the property to be
for liability on the claim that is the
seized is an insurance3 contract
78
basis of the judgment.

These same exceptions apply to agencies and instrumentalities but
they affect a broader range of property. Moreover, certain additional
exceptions facilitate seizure of agencies' or instrumentalities' property. 379 In addition, immunity is expressly extended to certain international organizations in the process of disbursing funds to foreign

of a foreign state's central bank,3'
states, 380 to the property
property.38 2

or to

military

372. House Report, supra note 2, at 27-28, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 6626-27.
373. See Kahale & Vega, supra note 4, at 217.
374. See Carl, supra note 4, at 1038-40; Smit I, supra note 159, at 67; Day in
Court, supra note 3, at 569.
375. 28 U.S.C. § 1609 (1976).
376. Id. § 1610(a), (b).
377. Id. § 1610(a). For agencies and instrumentalities, the property to be seized
must also be located in the United States, but it need not be used for commercial
activity. Instead, it is sufficient if the agency or instrumentality is engaged in commercial activity in the United States. Id. § 1610(b).

378. Id. § 1610(a)(1)-(5).
379. Id. § 1610(b)(1)-(2).
380. Id. § 1611(a).
381. Id. § 1611(b)(1). Immunity is not available, however, if the bank has explicitly waived its immunity from execution.
382. Id. § 1611(b)(2).
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The House Report describes the provisions on execution as furnishing a remedy to a judgment creditor if, after a reasonable period, a
foreign state or its enterprise has failed to satisfy a final judgment. 38 3
The Act is intended to alter prior law, which accorded foreign states
absolute immunity from execution even in ordinary commercial litigation involving the seizure of commercial assets. The drafters viewed
the enforcement of judgments against foreign state property as a
controversial subject marked by a trend toward limiting immunity. 38 4 That trend is evidenced by a number of treaties concluded by
the United States and conventions more widely ratified.3 15 The FSIA
follows the trend by "partially lowering the barrier of immunity from
execution, so as to make this immunity conform more closely with the
' 386
provisions on jurisdictional immunity."
The policy underlying the provisions on execution reflects a rough
balancing of interests, subject to the legislators' characteristic caution
when breaking with a traditional rule. 387 Prior law was inadequate
in that it absolutely protected the interests of foreign states while
disregarding plaintiffs' interests in satisfying claims that were judicially legitimized. 388 The FSIA partially corrects that misbalanced
policy judgment by denying immunity in a number 389
of situations that
do not implicate sensitive interests of foreign states.
2. Prejudgment Attachments
Both executions on property and prejudgment attachments involve
seizures of a foreign state's property, yet the Act more liberally permits executions. This difference is justified for at least two reasons.
First, execution is a more discriminating procedure than prejudgment
attachment in that it is based on a legitimized claim and is limited to
the amount of the judgment. Prejudgment attachment, by comparison, is based on potentially proper claims and occasionally on speculative assertions by the plaintiff. In addition, it is limited only by the
value of the property attached.
Second, plaintiffs' interests are more compelling for executions than
for prejudgment attachments. Execution embodies a plaintiff's vital
interest in vindicating rights that have been judicially recognized. The
FSIA provides no alternative method of enforcing those rights, and
383. House Report, supra note 2, at 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 6606.
384. Id. at 8, 27, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6606, 6626.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. See Problem of Execution Uniformity, supra note 4, at 575.
388. See Proposed Statutory Elimination, supra note 4, at 165-66.
389. A notable exception is the provision permitting execution on property expropriated in violation of international law, 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (a)(3) (1976), a situation
about which foreign states are likely to be extremely sensitive.
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their denial would seriously compromise the policy of granting plaintiffs recourse against foreign states in non-sensitive situations. Execution is thus a vital procedure and is properly included in the statute,
the general distaste for seizure of foreign states' propnotwithstanding
0
erty.

39

The main purpose of prejudgment attachments was the commencement of in rem legal action, a function now served by in personam

procedures. 3 91 Plaintiffs' other interests in prejudgment attachment
are less significant and have been protected in part by the FSIA.
Nonetheless, there are problems with the Act's less liberal approach
towards prejudgment attachments.
Section 1610(d) permits prejudgment attachments exceptionally to
freeze property within the forum for possible satisfaction of a later

judgment.392 The section requires both an explicit waiver of immunity from prejudgment attachment and a showing that the purpose of
the attachment is to secure satisfaction of a possible later judgment
and not to obtain jurisdiction. 39 3 A significant problem with this
limitation is that it plainly does not protect a plaintiff who lacks the
waiver. Such plaintiffs are exposed to a real danger that the foreign

state defendant will remove its assets from the forum and, in effect,
390. The sensitivity to execution issues is shown by the Act's provision specifically
extending immunity to the funds of foreign states' central banks and to military
property. Id. § 1611(b); House Report, supra note 2, at 30-31, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6629-30; cf. id. at 21-22, 26-27, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6619-21, 6624-26 (denial of immunity for commercial
claims, for maritime liens, for execution on certain properties and for service of
process).
391. House Report, supra note 2, at 26-27, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 6624-26; see Smit I, supra note 159, at 54-56.
392. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(d) (1976); see Smit I, supra note 159, at 65 n.98 (in the
litigation between Martropico Compania Naviera, S.A. against Pertamina, defendants not only sought in vain to vacate prejudgment attachments laid before the
effective date of the Act, but also made extensive efforts, including re-negotiation of
various large contracts, to ensure that they would have no assets in the United
States); see also von Mehren, supra note 4, at 44-45 & n.51 (sets forth the rationales
underlying prejudgment attachments); Sovereign Immunity, supra note 4, at 450
(regarding the problem of a "flight of assets."). See generally Smit II, supra note 319
(regarding the enduring utility of the in rem rules).
393. A series of Iranian cases considered under what circumstances a waiver from
prejudgment attachments exists. E.g., New Eng. Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran
Power Generation & Transmission Co., 502 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); E-Systems, Inc. v. Iran, 491 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Behring Int'l, Inc. v.
Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 383 (D.N.J. 1979); Reading & Bates Corp.
v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., 478 F. Supp. 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see McGreevey, supra
note 228, at 400-11; Comment, Prejudgment Attachment of Frozen Iranian Assets,
69 Cal. L. Rev. 837 (1981); Comment, Prejudgment Attachment of Iranian Assets in
the United States: Waiving Sovereign Iminmunity-Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Imperial
Iranian Air Force, 13 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 675 (1981); Comment, The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act: The Use of Pre-JudgmentAttachment to Ensure Satisfaction of Anticipated judgments, 2 Nw.J. Int'l L. & Bus. 517 (1980): 12 L. & Pol'y
Int'l Bus. 1001 (1980).
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become judgment proof. This prospect may discourage plaintiffs lacking an explicit waiver from instituting legal action at all, thus defeatof adjudicating disputes that arise from
ing the statutory policy
394
non-immune activity.
Plaintiffs can, of course, seek to protect themselves by always including in contracts an explicit waiver of immunity from prejudgment
attachment. As one commentator notes, however, that strategy is not
available to plaintiffs whose actions are not based on contract. Moreover, contracts concluded before the Act's effective date may not
include sufficiently explicit waivers. Even post-Act contracts may
have too general a provision to satisfy the requirements of section
1610(d).3

In effect, the Act's allowance of prejudgment attachments for security purposes is too restrictive and should be made available in a
wider range of circumstances. Attachment should be available in the
absence of an explicit waiver by the defendant state. To control the
availability of such attachments, plaintiffs might be required to show
a "likelihood" or "probability" that the defendant state will remove
assests from the forum to escape a possible later judgment.
Prejudgment attachments should also be permitted in cases of explicit waiver, irrespective of the likelihood that assets will be removed
to escape judgment. This would enable plaintiffs to protect themselves
in contracts with foreign states, while putting the latter on notice of
the possibility of prejudgment attachments. Moreover, if a foreign
state has negotiated and contracted in regard to its immunity from
prejudgment attachments, the FSIA policy of avoiding irritation does
not seem operative. No policy reason exists for depriving private
persons and foreign states of the freedom to negotiate and contract
with respect to the valuable device of prejudgment attachments. Even
the former absolute rule of immunity from suit permitted states to
waive such immunity, thus avoiding the excessively protective stance
now embodied in section 1610(d).
Another function traditionally served by prejudgment attachment
is the assurance of an orderly disposition of assets when several plaintiffs bring actions against one defendant. The order of prejudgment
attachments frequently determines plaintiffs' priorities in satisfying
judgments from the defendant's assets. 396 The FSIA throws this sys394. Smit I, supra note 159, at 67-69.
395. Id. at 68; see von Mehren, supra note 4, at 55-56 (parties can draft contract
clause waiving immunity from suit and execution). A contract provision may be
broadly drafted and intended to extend to prejudgment attachments, but if it makes
no explicit reference to prejudgment attachments, it may not constitute a waiver
within the meaning of section 1610(d). Id.
396. E.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 6226 (McKinney 1980). The importance of
attachment priorities is illustrated by the so-called Nigerian cement contract cases,
involving numerous plaintiffs, many of whom relied on attachments of Nigerian
funds to commence action and secure possible later judgments. Most of these actions
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tern into disarray because section 1610(d) permits only certain types of
plaintiffs to establish their priority for later satisfaction of a judgment.
If plaintiffs do not meet the requirement of the section, the) are
unfairly disadvantaged and may find themselves obtaining meaningless judgments if the defendant state's assets have been attached by
other parties. This problem could be remedied by liberalizing section
1610(d) to allow prejudgment attachments for the purpose of determining priorities among several plaintiffs.
3. Execution
The Act's execution provisions are also subject to criticism for not
reaching a more finely tuned balance between plaintiffs' and defendants' interests. The commercial property exception of section
1610(a)(2), 397 for example, states that the property of a foreign state
shall not be immune from execution if it is used for a commercial
activity and located in the United States, and if the plaintiff's claim is
based on that commercial activity or upon another commercial activity in the United States for which the property formerly was used.
The general policy underlying that exception to immunity is sound
because commercial property is not ordinarily of such a sensitive
nature that the satisfaction of a judgment should be denied. The
problem is with section 1610(a)(2) which draws a tenuous and problematic distinction that is not supported by that policy. The clause
restricts execution to judgments based on the commercial activity for
which the property to be seized is or was used. The statute thus
distinguishes between property related to the plaintiff's claim and
property unrelated to that claim, permitting execution only upon the
former. This distinction, however, places too much weight on the
connection between commercial property and the activity upon
which the plaintiff's claim is based. Extensive litigation may be necessary merely to determine whether the requisite nexus exists.
Moreover, this potentially problematic distinction is not relevant to
the operative policies. The primary goal in extending immunity from
execution should be to shield a foreign state from interference in
sensitive areas and from disruption of important functions. That concern, however, is independent of the nature of the plaintiff's claim. A
foreign state's property does not become less sensitive if the plaintiff's

were commenced well before the effective date of the FSIA. For example, in National Am. Corp. v. Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affJd iner., 597
F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979), the court stated that plaintiff's attachment order was subject
to two prior attachments. Id. at 633. For an extensive listing of the Nigerian cases
filed in United States courts, see Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F.
Supp. 1284, 1290 n.22 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981).
397. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2) (1976), see House Report, supra note 2. at 28, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6627.
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claim is closely related to its use and, conversely, does not become
more sensitive if the plaintiff's claim is unrelated to its use. The
fortuitous presence in the forum of property connected to the plaintiff's claim is not a rational basis for distinguishing between otherwise
similar judgments.
The foregoing problems can be illustrated by applying section
1610(a)(2) to a hypothetical. A foreign state might maintain and staff
an office in the United States for the purposes of promoting trade with
Americans, negotiating particular transactions, and soliciting capital
investment. 3 8 The trade delegation, which does not constitute an
agency or instrumentality, 3 9 might enter into a variety of contractual

relations with private persons in the United States. It might be party
to a lease for office space, employ American staff, borrow money,
invest assets, and enter into contracts with American importers and
exporters.
In the event of a breach by the foreign state of one or more contracts, judgment creditors would seek to seize assets used in connection with the activities of the trade delegation. Applying the FSIA,
one might conclude that all assets used or managed by the trade
delegation are property of the foreign state, located in the United
States, and used for commercial activity in the United States. That
would not end the inquiry, however, for the crucial issue is whether
that commercial activity is also the basis of the plaintiffs' respective
claims. This issue raises substantial difficulties, for it hinges on a
precise description of activities that can be correctly described in
various ways.
The activity of the trade delegation might be described broadly as
"promoting trade with the United States." One would then argue that
any of the plaintiffs' respective claims are related to the defendant's
promotion of trade. The counter-argument, however, is that a commercial activity must be described more narrowly, or else virtually
any claim could be based on it. In addition, the foreign state might
have numerous other assets in the United States that are used in
connection with the promotion of trade, none of which would be
remotely related to the plaintiffs' claims.
Defining activities more narrowly, however, raises new difficulties
in dividing assets among the various activities. The activities at issue
would be described as "leasing office space" and "procuring grain,"
but a court would be hard-pressed to allocate specific funds and assets
398. See Garcfa-Mora, supra note 3, at 350-54. See generally Fensterwald, supra
note 62, at 634-39 (immunity accorded Soviet trade organizations in U.S. and other
countries).
399. If the trade delegation was a separate agency or instrumentality, the connection between its property and plaintiff's claim would not be an issue, because its
entire property would be subject to execution regardless of whether such a connection
existed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b)(1)-(2) (1976).
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to them for purposes of execution. 400 Even if those determinations
can be made by a court, they raise substantial accounting problems. 40 1 In addition, the trade delegation might commingle funds
with its central government or other state organs, thus further complicating execution proceedings.
The Act raises these questions through its circumscription of seizable assets, but provides no standards for answering them. More
importantly, however, those difficult issues are raised unnecessarily,
for they are not relevant from a policy perspective. Rules of immunity
from execution should balance the state's interest in non-interference
against the private interest in enforcement of judgments. Applied to
the above hypothetical, such rules should focus on the extent to which
seizure of governmental assets would threaten sensitive governmental
concerns. In that inquiry, the basis of the plaintiff's claim is irrelevant.
The foregoing analysis extends not only to claims based on commercial activities, but also to other claims. Since the legislators have
judged that the seizure of commercial property located in the United
States does not implicate and threaten important functions of the
foreign state, execution should be permitted for any claim brought
under sections 1605 through 1607.402
These problems primarily affect plaintiffs. The remedy suggested, a
liberalizing of the commercial property exception, would go a long
way toward promoting plaintiffs' interests more effectively. It offers
greater flexibility in defining who may seize property and thus makes
execution available to a wider range of plaintiffs.
From a defendant's perspective, however, foreign states have very
substantial interests in shielding their property from seizure. The
liberalizing of the commercial property exception in favor of plaintiffs
may require a countervailing protection in favor of foreign states. The
most effective means of implementing such protection is in the form of
a saving clause similar to the provision proposed for immunity from
suit.4 03 The saving clause would permit, or require, a court to deny
400. For example, should a lessor be able to seize only assets specifically used for
the lease that is the basis of his claim or could he attach assets used in connection with
other office space or for overhead? Would a seller of grain be able to execute only
upon assets earmarked for his grain supply contract or could he rely on assets used for
general grain purchases or other purchases?
401. judicial Adoption, supra note 46, at 326 n.56.
402. Prior to the FSIA, one commentator argued that "property utilized in the
performance of activities which are not necessary to the exercise of an essential
governmental function should be subject to execution in satisfaction of judgments."
Id. at 326. A similar critique of the execution provisions is offered in von Mehren,
supra note 4, at 61-65. Von Mehren also notes the problem of relating plaintiff's
claim to the activity for which the property is used. Id. at 63.
403. Lauterpacht, supra note 3, also proposes that if immunity from execution is
abolished in principle, the foreign state should be able to apply for a stay of execution
under certain conditions. Id. at 243; see supra notes 251-55 and aecompanying text.
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execution upon otherwise vulnerable property-that is commercial
property-when the defendant state shows that execution would defeat an important governmental interest.
Naturally, any seizure of property, commercial or otherwise, will
cause some disruption in the smooth operation of government, or the
implementation of economic policy. 40 4 Special statutory protection
should thus be limited to substantial disruptions affecting vital public
functions. A developing country, for example, should be able to prevent the seizure of commercial assets earmarked for grain purchases if
it shows that its population is suffering from a hunger epidemic and
that sufficient grain cannot be obtained without those funds. The
inclusion of a sufficiently high standard in the saving clause would
ensure that foreign states cannot defeat execution by showing the
existence of frivolous concerns or insubstantial interests.
The proposed revisions would better accommodate the conflicting
interests of plaintiffs and foreign state defendants. The revisions
would also have incidental benefits. First, foreign states would be less
likely to remove commercial assets from the forum if they could
protect sensitive or vital property by a showing of a substantial governmental interest. Second, the liberalization of the commercial property exception avoids the complex and unworkable distinction between property related to the plaintiff's claim and property unrelated
to that claim, thus eliminating a potentially major litigation problem.
One section of the Act achieves a balance of interests and a division
of responsibility between the judiciary and the legislature that is
noteworthy for its instructive character. Section 1 610(c) states that no
attachment or execution shall be permitted unless a court has first
determined that a reasonable period of time has elapsed following the
entry of judgment. 40 5 In addition, any order of attachment or execution must be made by a court rather than a clerk or local sheriff, as is
permitted in some states. 406 The House Report describes some of the
factors that a court should consider in determining whether the period
elapsed has been reasonable. Those factors include the existence of
required procedures before the foreign state can make payment,
representations as to steps being taken to make payment, and evidence
that the foreign state is about to remove assets from the jurisdiction to
frustrate satisfaction of the judgment. 40 7 Section 1610(c) is intended
to have courts exercise their discretion in permitting execution.

404. See supra pt. 1I(D)(2).
405. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(c) (1976); House Report, supra note 2, at 30, reprinted in
1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6629.
406. House Report, supra note 2, at 30, reprintedin 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 6629.
407. Id.
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The policy underlying section 1610(c) is sound. It seeks to give
plaintiffs reasonable assurance that execution will be available, while
recognizing possible difficulties faced by states in liquidating funds for
satisfaction of a judgment. Accordingly, the statute requires courts to
balance various factors in determining whether a foreign state has had
a reasonable time period available to satisfy a judgment. Moreover, if
indications of bad faith on the part of the foreign state exist, the
plaintiffs interest in preventing removal of assets also becomes a
factor.
Section 1610(c) is significant because it is the only instance in which
the Act expressly gives the courts discretion to balance a number of
factors operating variously in plaintiff's or defendant's favor. This
indicates that the drafters were willing to delegate policy decisions to
the courts in at least one sensitive area of sovereign immunity, and
suggests that other problems of sovereign immunity law could also be
solved by outlining certain policy factors and instructing courts to use
their discretion in reaching a "reasonable" result based on those factors.

408

Additionally, section 1610(c) implies that some immunity issues
cannot be resolved by fixed statutory rules but rather need to be
addressed in an ad hoc fashion by courts, guided by legislative policy
input. The legislators concluded that foreign states should have some
grace period before execution to overcome special obstacles the),
might face in satisfying a judgment. A statutorily fixed time, however,
is no solution because it might be too short for liquidating funds to
satisfy very large judgments, yet could be long enough to enable
foreign states to remove assets from the jurisdiction. The best way to
resolve that dilemma is to specify an indefinite period to be set by a
court on the basis of various factors. 40 1 Other problems of sovereign
immunity, for which statutorily predetermined results are unjust or
410
impractical, may also be appropriate for that kind of solution.
Finally, section 1610(c) will give courts an opportunity to demonstrate their capacity to weigh a number of policy factors and apply
open-ended standards in reaching sound and consistent decisions. If
the FSIA is amended in the future, the courts' capacity to meet the
challenge will constitute an argument in favor of solving other problems by judicial discretion.

408. The clause "reasonable period" appears in the statute at § 1610(c).
409. See Comment, Sovereign Immunity-lWaiver and Execution: Arguments
from Continental Jurisprudence,74 Yale L.J. 887 (1965), which states that in Italy
and Greece courts cannot order execution without prior approval of the executive
branch. Id. at 914-15. That requirement may be in part intended to solve the same
problem addressed in § 1610(c).
410. See supra notes 251-55, 403-06 and accompanying text; see also Weber, supra
note 4, at 39 (Congress should give courts a high degree of flexibility in the sovereign
immunity area).
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CONCLUSION

The criticisms of the FSIA that are made in this Article should not
obscure the Act's significance. The prior law of sovereign immunity in
the United States was unsound and unpredictable. The statute represents important policy advances and achieves a measure of certainty
in litigation against foreign states.
Nevertheless, the FSIA requires improvement in some areas. The
jurisdictional scheme, for example, should be substantially revised.
The role of the executive branch should be refined. On a number of
issues, the judiciary should be given more discretion, subject to policy
guidelines.
Granting the courts wider latitude would enhance their ability to
make discriminating policy judgments. Although the FSIA accounts
for operative policies and competing interests better than prior law,
many of its provisions could be tuned still more finely to resolve the
delicate problems arising from legal action against foreign countries.
Moreover, the international law of sovereign immunity is likely to
continue developing in response to political and economic changes in
international relations. Those developments will heighten the need for
judicial latitude and a sensitive balancing of interests, lest United
States law again lag behind that of other countries.
This Article seeks to develop an approach to sovereign immunity
which will satisfy that need. It focuses on competing interests and
policies rather than on fixed rights and precepts. The underlying
premise is that foreign state immunity is not inherent in the international order or the concept of the nation-state, but instead is a function of the ever changing and growing intercourse across national
boundaries between persons and states.
The four problems of sovereign immunity law addressed in the
foregoing pages are not exhaustive of the troubled areas. Although an
attempt was made to identify the most important issues, a complete
treatment would cover many others. These include the status of agencies and instrumentalities, the sources and effects of waivers of different immunities, the relation between sovereign immunity and the Act
of State doctrine, 411 the interaction of federal and state law, and
conflict of laws questions. In addition, comparative studies should be
made of the laws of other countries regarding various elements of
sovereign immunity, including especially the success of the British
State Immunities Act of 1978.412 Any study of those topics, however,
should begin with an understanding of the policies and concepts
fundamental to foreign state immunity.
411. See Hill, Sovereign Immunity and the Act of State Doctrine-Theory and
Policy in American Law, to be published in January 1982 in 46 Rabels Zeitschrlft ffir
auslindisches und internationales Privatrecht (Max Planck Institute, Hamburg, Germany 1982).
412. The State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33; see Note, Reciprocal Influence of
British and United States Law: Foreign Sovereign Immunity Law from the Schooner
Exchange to the State Immunity Act of 1978, 13 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 761 (1980).

